

“The Spanish People are Ungovernable”: Heralds of Fascism in Pre-Civil War Spain

An Honors Thesis (POLS 404)

by

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Abstract

In the field of fascism studies, Spain is already a generally neglected case, despite the rule of Francisco Franco and the Falange lasting well after the fall of other fascist governments across Europe. Within the study of Spain, the Civil War, and the Franco regime, serious consideration of the radical right figures immediately preceding that time is even further limited. Specifically, this thesis is an examination of the work of such figures – Ernesto Giménez Caballero, Jose María Albiñana, and Ramiro Ledesma Ramos, and artists and authors Miguel de Unamuno, Antonio Machado, and Salvador Dalí. An examination of their writings and works reveals three major themes of preoccupation: *Reconquista* and the end of the Spanish Empire, the Spanish Golden Age, and the nature of violence. All three themes have a focus on the generation of a new Spanish culture, the installation of a nationalist government in Spain, and a call for violent resistance to the ruling Republics. These themes later formed the basis of Spanish nationalism that motivated the coup establishing Franco as Caudillo and have since been taken up as impetus to organize groups on the contemporary radical right.

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Process Analysis

For my Honors thesis, I sought out a topic that would combine all of my majors: philosophy, political science, and Spanish. At the time, I was taking a class about 20th Century Spain as well as a class about gender and masculinity studies, so I figured that a combination of the two would make for an interesting project. I had also taken several classes on fascism studies and the radical right and had decided that a focus on such subjects would make for an interesting and productive thesis-writing process. The summer before my senior year, my advisor and I put together a reading list of articles, books, and essays on those topics.

As I read through the histories, however, I kept coming across the names of three figures – Ramiro Ledesma Ramos, Jose María Albiñana, and Ernesto Giménez Caballero. Even insofar as their names kept coming up, none of the things I was reading offered much insight into who they were, why they were important, or any real analysis of their work or its meaning. The more I (did not) learn about them, the more I wanted to know, and the more research I did, the more it seemed little real consideration had been paid to their ideas, on top of the relatively limited inclusion of Spain in the corpus of the work of fascism studies at all. Specifically, one of the leading English-language figures on the study of Spanish fascism is a professor at the University of Wisconsin named Stanley Payne. I read several of his books on 20th Century Spain and, while he mentions Ledesma Albiñana, Giménez Caballero, and the *noventayochistas* in the first chapters of one of his books, *Falange*, he actively denounces their relevance to the study of fascism and their ability to be studied at all.

I decided to center my thesis around developing an idea of what the work of Ledesma, Albiñana, and Giménez Caballero meant and the ideas upon which it centered, later choosing to also include the creative works of two members of the *noventayochistas*, or the Generation of 98,

an artistic movement out of Spain at the time, Miguel de Unamuno and Antonio Machado, as well as Salvador Dalí. I became really familiar with the Interlibrary Loan homepage very quickly as I requested everything I could find by any one of these people, and spent longer than I would care to admit reading as much of what they had written as I could. I think I probably read almost as much in Spanish in the course of a couple of months as I did in years of Spanish classes.

Out of everything I read, I focused in on articles from Ledesma's newspaper, Albiñana's only book, *España bajo la dictadura republicana*, and *Genio de España* by Giménez Caballero, which provided the most substantive cross-section of the main ideas of each of the thinkers. This became the central motivating project of my thesis, to find the connecting threads between the thought of these three thinkers and consider them more robustly and with explicit consideration for their positions as political figures than I had been able to find. In other words, I was trying to fill a hole in existing scholarship on Spanish fascism.

I focused in on the three major themes I saw recurring in the work of all of the figures I was studying. Specifically, they all wrote extensively on the topics of *Reconquista* and the loss of Spanish empire, on the *Siglo de oro*, the Spanish Golden Age, and on the subject of violence. The exact ways in which they wrote about each of these topics is, obviously, the subject of more extensive analysis in the body of my thesis, but one thing I realized in the process of exploring these topics was the overlaps between the languages used to address these topics by these figures and the kinds of ways in which the contemporary radical right, especially groups like the Identitarians, CasaPound, and the like, used to address, in some cases, literally the same issues. For example, one of the central rallying cries of the Identitarian movement, a Pan-European youth movement largely focused on what they call the "Anti-Islamization" of Europe, is *Reconquista*, the same as one of the main themes of the people whom I was studying. After

looking more into the contemporary radical right, in part thanks to my enrollment in a class with my advisor, I found more and more points of connection between the fascist heralds (the term I decided to use to address the group collectively) and current-day groups. I used these connections to motivate my thesis throughout and used them as a larger focus of my introduction and conclusion. While filling a hole in existing scholarship is in itself a more than satisfying motivation for an academic project, such a connection I think helped to make my thesis more interesting to people perhaps without an existing interest in Spanish politics.

With the help of my advisor, I constructed my new project, using Quentin Skinner's intellectual history as my methodological framework. For Skinner examining only the works of a thinker or looking at them only relative to their influence on future works are not fully productive ways of considering their ideas. For one, misapplication of ideas abounds, a phenomenon Skinner calls perlocutionary uptake. Furthermore, constructing a mythology of coherence, or prolepsis, attributing to a thinker that which followed them and which they could not have reasonably foreseen does little by way of helping us understand their own ideas. In this way, only treating Ledesma, Albiñana, and Giménez Caballero as the beginning of Francoism, when they could not have anticipated the particular fascism that Franco and the Falange would create does our analysis of their work a disservice.

The actual process of writing my thesis was a long one. I wrote so many (bad) drafts of each of my chapters, some of which my advisor very graciously read and helped me to make them much better with each revision. I feel infinitely more well-versed in the practices of academic writing now than I did at the start of this process. I am very fortunate in that I found my topic a very interesting one, and that the more I learned about every facet, the more I wanted to know. I realized quickly, however, that I found much more interesting than was actually

necessary to make my argument. One of the first drafts of my introduction contained over ten unbroken pages of the history of Spain starting in the 700s. While not necessarily a problem, since my thesis focuses on Spain in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, certainly a lot of unnecessary content, made that much dense by my not including a single reference to the actual topic of my thesis nor how such content related (even if I thought it did) to my study. That kind of thing happened more than I would care to admit, but taught me, importantly, a crucial lesson about editing, not just in the sense of adding comma where I forgot them, but trimming content where it was not necessary as interesting as I personally may have found it.

I also felt at several points especially in the beginning of this process, since the initial motivating move of my thesis was a critique of existing scholarship, that in order to be justified in my claim I needed to know everything there was to know about every single aspect of every topic on which I was writing. If I missed even the smallest iota of information, my thinking was, my whole argument could be deemed invalid. While establishing credibility is certainly important, there were many times in which I let this feeling of needing to know everything prevent me from actually starting to write. Getting into the process of actually writing, of just starting even when I felt like reading another book about Spain in the 1600s would definitely be the one thing my thesis needed to be perfect (it definitely never was), has made me a significantly more confident writer and scholar. While I still wish there was more, I could include in my finished thesis, reading it over, I am very happy with the way it turned out, something that I rarely feel with my own writing.

Introduction: The Pre-Fascist Question

Even as we continue to acknowledge and track the rise and governing power of far-right parties and organizations across much of the world, the idea of an actual fascist, dictatorial government, especially in Europe or the United States, seems somewhat distant. Our conversations about increasingly right-wing government and the rising acceptance and election of hyper-conservative figures seems like a problem, but rarely, if ever, seems as though it is treated as an actual threat to western conceptions of liberal democratic governance. Discussion of fascist government inevitably turns to and is centered on the two most popular and, indeed, dramatic examples: World War II-era Italy and Germany. The violent and sudden ends of such regimes allow us to, rightly or wrongly, afford ourselves some intellectual comfort. The powers of traditional political liberalism triumphed over the forces of evil, the forces of fascism and of intolerance. The threat disposed of, we can place fascist dictatorship firmly in the camp of those things that exist in the past, now having been eradicated nearly a century ago. Surprisingly for many, though, actual fascist government is not so far removed from the European continent. In fact, the end of fascist dictatorship in Europe came not in the 1940s but in 1975, and, circumstances permitting, could have been much later. For a variety of reasons, the absolute rule of Francisco Franco, then Caudillo of Spain, and head of a fascist government experienced a singular longevity among his fascist compatriots.

Spain presents a unique challenge and perspective on the overall study of the history and nature of fascism. Indeed, whether or not the rule of Franco and the Falange even constitutes a fascist government is the subject of some debate.¹ This challenge and debate frequently means

¹ While there is debate over whether the Spanish case constitutes a legitimate example of fascism, following the arguments of Stanley Payne and the idea of the fascist maximum, for the purposes of this paper, it will be treated as such. For further information, see Stanley G. Payne, *Fascism in Spain, 1923-1977* (University of Wisconsin Press, 2000).

the Spanish case is relegated to singular chapters, counterexamples, and the margins of otherwise comprehensive examinations of the history of fascism.² Indeed, Spanish Fascism, or Falangism, the name for the general ideology and ruling party of the Francoist regime, literally translated as “the ideology of the phalanx,” is distinct from many traditional conceptions of fascism.

Falangism is far more explicitly religiously committed than other fascist regimes, pledging an explicit allegiance and committing themselves to the promotion of Catholic values.³ Rather than promoting policies of racialism and racial purity, most Falangists viewed racial diversity and mixing as a strength, establishing a stronger and more dominant Spain, focusing instead on cultural unity and supremacy.⁴ The lack of coverage, both academically and popularly, relative to other fascist regimes, places Spanish fascism in a strange position of being, arguably, among the most successful fascist governments and among the least understood.

Part of the Falange’s uniqueness and longevity is due in part to Spain’s particular history. For more than two centuries preceding the military coup and three-year civil war establishing Franco as Spain’s leader, Spain had little by way of stable government. In the 18th century, conflicts between the Bourbons and Habsburgs for the right to rule over the Iberian Peninsula left Spain divided and governmentally challenged, problems only exasperated by the Napoleonic

² R.J.B. Bosworth, ed., *The Oxford Handbook of Fascism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).; Jens Rydgren, ed., *The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018).; Aristotle A. Kallis, ed., *The Fascism Reader* (New York: Routledge, 2003).; Mark Sedgwick, ed., *Key Thinkers of the Radical Right* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019).; Kevin Passmore, *Fascism: A Very Short Introduction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).

³ Payne, *Fascism in Spain*.

⁴ Payne, *Fascism in Spain*; It should be noted here that, while the Falange did not, as an official position, advocate a particular racial supremacy, individuals in the party frequently held such views. On the whole, though, the Falange was, as an organization, in support of Hitler’s Germany and Mussolini’s Italy even if their actual involvement in the war was relatively limited, committing them at least via complicity to such ideas. It should further not be read that a lack or racialized policy precluded them from the promotion and use of eugenicist policies, focused most frequently instead on ableism rather than racism.

Wars in the early 19th century. Attempts to overthrow French rule resulted in a constitutional monarchy that lasted for less than a decade, at which time, the Carlist Wars, a series of wars of succession over the rightful monarch nearly bankrupt the country. Tensions ultimately culminated in *La Gloriosa*, or Glorious Revolution, temporarily establishing Isabella II to the throne, though she was quickly deposed.⁵ Isabella's overwhelming unpopularity was able to temporarily unite conservative and liberal forces, but with a unifying purpose gone after her deposition, the cooperation quickly faltered and within the year more war broke out. A new Spanish constitution was implemented in 1869, and in 1870, lacking a regent, Amadeo I was elected King. Continuing disturbances, Carlist and otherwise, continued into the first years of Amadeo I's rule, and in 1873, he declared that "the Spanish people are ungovernable," abdicating the throne, once again leaving Spain in search of a leader and a government.⁶ Instability and conflict continued through the rest of the 19th and into the 20th century, with no one governing group able to hold power stably for more than a few years.

At the same time, Spain continued to lag behind the rest of Europe. Even into the early twentieth century, two-thirds of the Spanish workforce were still working in agriculture while much of the rest of the continent was increasingly urbanizing and industrializing.⁷ Farmers largely resisted modernization of agricultural practices, limiting exports. Poor economic performance and continuing rural focus also limited investment and taxation revenue, limiting the Spanish government's ability to operate and Spanish industry's ability to expand.⁸ The area of Spain that did experience significant growth and modernization during this period was

⁵ Robert E. Wilson, "The Claim of Carlos Hugo de Bourbon-Parma to the Spanish Throne," *Background* 8, no. 3 (1964): 187-93.

⁶ Andrew Sangster, *Probing the Enigma of Franco* (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2018).

⁷ Joseph Harrison, "The Economic History of Spain," *Economic History Review* 2, no. 1 (1990): 79-89.

⁸ Harrison, "Economic History of Spain."

Catalonia, a region with a distinct language and culture and rights to at least partial self-governance dating back centuries, a fact that would later work to spur and motivate nationalist tensions. Prior to the rise of the Falange, though, nationalist sentiment in Spain seemed to be relatively lacking, especially in any comprehensive or organized sense.⁹

In the study of fascisms, the search for an ideological beginning usually stops when the ideas are traced back to the intellectual avant-garde which tended to precede the rise of fascist regimes. These heralds of fascism, most famously the Futurists in pre-Fascist Italy, served as a kind of vanguard of fascist ideas. Usually made up of intellectuals, these groups published fairly extensively, often opening up and operating their own presses and publication houses. They provided a valuable source of radicalization for both the general public of fascist nations and for the eventual leaders of such movements, organizing events and disseminating nationalist literature and thought.¹⁰ Almost universally, such groups preached violence, a return to a not-forgotten age of national greatness available again to their people if only they took up arms to bring it about.¹¹ In the case of the Futurists, F.T. Marinetti and others ended up becoming a part of the actual transitional fascist government.¹²

Equivalent groups arise in most every major story of the rise of fascism. A singular or focused study of such groups, however, seems to be lacking, especially in the case of Spanish fascism. Examination of figures like Ernesto Giménez Caballero, publisher of *La gaceta literaria*, a hyper-nationalist publishing house producing original Spanish nationalist works, or

⁹ Stanley G. Payne, *Falange: A History of Spanish Fascism* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967).

¹⁰ Lawrence Rainey, Christine Poggi, and Laura Wittman, ed., *Futurism: An Anthology* (United States: Sheridan Books, 2009).

¹¹ Payne, *Falange*.; Rainey, Poggi, and Wittman, *Futurism*.; Douglas W. Foard, *The Revolt of the Aesthetes: Ernesto Giménez Caballero and the Origins of Spanish Fascism* (Peter Lang Inc., International Academic Publishers, 1989).

¹² Rainey, Poggi, and Wittman, *Futurism*.

more broadly, the *noventayochistas*, or Generation of 98 a generation of authors and artists whose work had a particularly nationalist and even xenophobic bent, is relegated to the introduction of works examining the Falange or the Spanish case on the whole.¹³ There is a consistent and repeated identification of such groups, figures, and works as the logical precursors to “full-blown” fascism as it were, but relatively little analysis of them in their own right. If we continue to identify such groups as that which precipitates fascism, it seems worth bringing to bear a more complete examination of their ideas and methods, viewing them as ideologies, or at least ideological frameworks in their own right rather than continuing to view them only as imperfect fascisms.

It is the goal of this project to provide an in-depth examination of the ideas and writings of Spanish fascist heralds in themselves to provide a better understanding of the conditions leading to the development of their own ideas. This paper will examine the four most mentioned but least examined fascist heralds: Ernesto Giménez Caballero, the *noventayochistas*, specifically Miguel de Unamuno and Antonio Machado, Ramiro Ledesma Ramos, director of the paper *La conquista del estado*, and José María Albiñana, founder of the Spanish Nationalist Party.

Giménez Caballero was focused primarily on the precipitation of the “Universal Kingdom of Spain.”¹⁴ He felt as though, given their strong and prosperous history, if distant from when he wrote, Spain had a right to be proud and hyper-Spanish. He did not “intend to preach a return to the past,” explicitly, but rather wanted to create a Spain that was militarily and culturally pre-eminent.¹⁵ As far as Giménez Caballero was concerned, “Spain is and out to be at

¹³ Payne, *Falange*; Robert Kirsner, “Galdós and the Generation of 1898,” *Hispania* 33, no. 3 (1950): 240-42.; Óscar Rodríguez Barrerira, “The Many Heads of the Hydra: Local Parafascism in Spain and Europe, 1936-50,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 49, no. 4 (2014): 702-26.

¹⁴ Foard, *Revolt of the Aesthetes*.

¹⁵ Payne, *Falange*.

war.”¹⁶ There was nothing superior to the “exaltation of national sentiment.”¹⁷ Perhaps curiously, married to an Italian woman, he also felt that an alliance with Mussolini and Italy would aid in the re-establishment of the Spanish empire, an idea he lauded in *Genio de España*, a book he published through his press in 1932.¹⁸

The *noventayochistas*, or the Generation of 98, were a primarily artistic and more specifically literary movement shaped by, and indeed named for, the profound influence the Spanish-American War and the loss of the last Spanish colonies in 1898 had on the development of the identity of a generation of Spaniards.¹⁹ Authors like Miguel de Unamuno and Antonio Machado lived and fought through the very abrupt end of Spanish hegemony, a reality that shaped their writing. Focusing on the nature of what it meant to be Spanish, calls back to times when Spain was stronger and, to their view, therefore better are foregrounded in their writings.²⁰ Spain’s cultural backslide, as far as they were concerned, from the time of Cervantes and El Greco, needed redress. While it is sometimes argued that “they could contribute to Spanish nationalism no more than an esthetic attitude without social or political content,”²¹ their aesthetic reach gave rise to forms of expression for both the Falangist party itself as well as providing a direct route to radicalization for the common Spanish people, among whom Unamuno and Machado were particularly popular.²²

Ramiro Ledesma Ramos had a strong role in the formation of the JONS, or Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional Sindicalista, or the Councils of National-Syndicalist Offensive, working

¹⁶ Quoted in Payne, 8.

¹⁷ Quoted in Payne, 8.

¹⁸ Foard, *The Revolt of the Aesthetes*.

¹⁹ Biruté Cipliauskaitė, “The Noventayochistas and the Carlist Wars,” *Hispanic Review* 44, no. 3 (1976): 265-79.

²⁰ Ara H. Merjian, “Fascism, Gender, and Culture,” *Qui Parle* 13, no. 1 (2001): 1-12.

²¹ Payne, *Falange*, 5.

²² Foard, *Revolt of the Aesthetes*.

directly (though not necessarily harmoniously) with José Antonio Primo de Rivera.²³ Ledesma is also one of the central progenitors of both national-syndicalism and specifically of the proliferation of the idea of national-syndicalism in Spain. The JONS, after Ledesma had more or less cut ties with the organization, eventually joined forces with Franco and the Falange, the original name of the latter originally nominally including the JONS, established as the Falange Española de las Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional Sindicalista or FE de las JONS. Ledesma left the group over disagreements with Primo de Rivera and with the ideology of Falange, later founding his own party, *La patria libre*, *The Free Fatherland*, which directly and openly opposed the ruling Falange, and which he headed until his death in 1936.²⁴ Furthermore, his paper, *La conquista del estado*, became a key and influential publication, with the ideas therein and contributors with whom Ledesma worked serving very directly as a precursor to Francoist rule.²⁵

José María Albiñana is perhaps the most eccentric of all the figures examined here. A “fat, leather-lunged neurologist from Valencia,”²⁶ he spent some time in Mexico in the 1920s, during which time he lived through revolution and unrest. Upon being expelled from Mexico, Albiñana returned to Spain and founded the Spanish Nationalist Party, the first officially and forwardly nationalist Spanish political organization of the time.²⁷ His program focused mainly on the idea of “Tradition,” a more direct call for a return to Spain’s past. He considered himself an anti-intellectual and against the very idea of political parties, an ironic stance, perhaps for an author and founder of a political party.²⁸ While the organization itself met with little success, he

²³ Payne, *Falange*.

²⁴ Payne, *Falange*.

²⁵ Payne, *Falange*.

²⁶ Payne, *Falange*.

²⁷ Hugo García, “Historia de un mito político: el peligro comunista en el discurso de las derechos españolas, (1918-1936),” *Historia Social*, no. 51 (2005): 3-20.

²⁸ Payne, *Falange*.

was eventually elected to office immediately before the start of the Civil War, at which point he, like Ledesma, was met with an untimely death.²⁹

Part of the project of this analysis is to consider Ledesma, Giménez Caballero, Albiñana, and the *noventaochistas* beyond their relationship to fascism, either ideologically or chronologically. While it is true that many of their ideas and writings set the tone, or indeed that they as individuals they were involved in the foundation of Primo de Rivera and later Franco's ideologies and, it is equally true that each of these heralds did not necessarily, and given their antecedence, could not have, considered themselves the first building blocks of a particular fascism, but instead as the founders of their own particular politics. In this way, the following analysis will consider these figures not in relationship to what they preceded, but instead look at their ideas in their own right and to their own ends. While their ideas and goals were not perfectly formulated, even perhaps "fumbling"³⁰ or nothing more than "noisy suggestions"³¹ as is suggested in the justification to overlook their writings, they are developed enough to track the currents of thought present in their ideas as they evolved.

Understanding the relationship between what or how someone thinks and what they do has always been a daunting task. From more purely philosophical debates over whether thoughts have the ability to cause actions at all to more abstract debates over whether one can be absolved of responsibility for their actions because of the what or the ways they think, the relationship between belief and action is one of significance, particularly in the study of political ideology. At its core, an ideology provides the intellectual scaffolding by which an individual relates to the world around them. It "emerges out of the social structure and relations of people to that

²⁹ Foard, *Revolt of the Aesthetes*.

³⁰ Payne, *Falange*, 15.

³¹ Payne, *Falange*, 19.

structure,” but the *raison d’être* of ideology is to “*disguise* those relations in order to ensure its own smooth operation. It becomes naturalized.”³² Considered another way, they “serve as the bridging mechanism between contestability and determinacy, converting the inevitable variety of options into the monolithic certainty which is the unavoidable feature of a political decision, and which is the basis of the forging of a political identity.”³³ The goal of ideology is the de-contestation of essentially contested concepts, taking nebulous concepts that impact the ways in which one relates to the world and creating a way in which to consider and relate to them concretely.

The study of ideology is often, then, an attempt to explain action by way of belief. Understanding exactly what someone believes or what they thought when doing something, however, is next to impossible. In order to expand or clarify our attempts, we often turn to a movement or thinker’s ideological heritage, seeking to sharpen our own understanding by understanding the thought that influences them. Tracing the ideological roots of a movement on any scale is a difficult, and, at times, fraught task. We turn to the intellectual tradition of which they are a part, trace the roots of an ideology back to its preliminary stages, those who espouse incomplete or imperfect fledgling versions of a more final ideology. Theoretically, this process could continue *ad infinitum*. No ideology develops in a vacuum, nor does it emerge perfectly formed and it stands as the inheritor of a long history of ideas it used or adapted and those which it responded to.

It is from the idea of the context of the development of a particular set of ideas that we can draw our primary methodological approach, that developed by pre-eminent intellectual

³² David Buchbinder, *Studying Men and Masculinities* (New York: Routledge, 2013), 35.

³³ Michael Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 76-77.

historian Quentin Skinner. Skinner places a value on both the words and work of an author as well as the context in which they were created.³⁴ Especially relevant for our purposes is Skinner's warning against strict adherence to the mythology of doctrines. To focus solely on "finding anticipations of arguments that later [become] prominent, with a view to working out what the contribution of an author to a particular set of ideas [has] been," gives an illusion of coherence and foresight amongst and between authors and thinkers otherwise not necessarily related.³⁵ While Locke's work, for example, may be used to support later liberal arguments, Locke would hardly have considered himself a liberal. This "mythology of coherence" leads to what Skinner calls proleptic arguments, or those that assume things before they actually exist.

Skinner also warns against removing works from their context. Looking only at the words of a text and the words alone is, for Skinner, an inadequate approach to understanding their meaning. Producing anachronistic arguments, removing works from their situatedness in time prevents us from understanding what a concept or idea may have meant to an author, a conceptualization that may be at odds with that which have of it reading a work today.³⁶

In order to combat prolepsis, Skinner advocates looking at works in their context, though cautions that context is not enough to explain every aspect of a work. Skinner's primary approach to intellectual history is twofold – focusing both on the words of a text and their meaning as well as the context in which they were written, a synthesis of two other dominant approaches in the field of intellectual history.³⁷ This combination of text and context places a

³⁴ Quentin Skinner, "Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas," *History and Theory* 8, no. 1 (1969): 3-53.

³⁵ Richard Whatmore, "Quentin Skinner and the Relevance of Intellectual History," in *A Companion to Intellectual History*, eds. Richard Whatmore and Brian Young (West Sussex: John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 2016) 114.

³⁶ Skinner, "Meaning and Understanding."

³⁷ Skinner, "Meaning and Understanding."

focus on that intention of an author in writing a particular text and produces a holistic but appropriately limited lens by which to frame our analysis.³⁸

With Skinner's methodological approach, there is even further impetus to examine the works of Ledesma and the like. Even if, perhaps, we were to accept the idea that the intellectual undertakings of these individuals and groups are not fully developed or coherent, such a standard is likely equally unattainable for most any ideology or set of ideas. If complete internal consistency and eventual real-world implementation were the criterion by which we determined whether or not to take time evaluating and considering the writings, theories, or ideas of any individual or ideology, we would have to dismiss even the most popular and ubiquitous of concepts out of hand. The intellectual undertakings of Ledesma, Giménez Caballero, Albiñana, and the *noventayochistas* are not singular nor necessarily fully developed internally nor certainly between one another. There is an obvious importance, however, in generating a better understanding of the languages and discourses into which they place themselves for the sake of better understanding the fascist ideologies they preceded, which, to an average researcher, represent a more obviously important project. Understanding the ideas of this group in their own right, though, while providing us a better understanding of Spanish fascism, also helps us to better understand pre- or proto-fascist groups as their own category. It may also allow us to identify the kinds of features that typify the intellectuals or creative threads that precede the rise of fascism in distinct contexts, a worthy undertaking if one is not swayed by such project's intellectual value in itself. The goal here, though, is primarily to examine more in depth the nature of those currents and provide a deeper understanding of the original thought of these individuals for their own sake.

³⁸ Skinner, "Meaning and Understanding."

These groups and individuals created the language adopted by, guided the goals of, and worked to radicalize the future members of the Falange, and even figures like Primo de Rivera and Francisco Franco themselves.³⁹ An identification and examination of the themes and ideas on which they were centered, areas of overlap and agreement, can help to provide a better understanding of the evolution of fascism and a better understanding of the evolution of ideologies on the whole. As such, the examination of these four figures will be centered on the recurrent themes in their writings and advocacy and the subsequent projects and ideas they generate or by which they justify using these ideas.

We will focus in on three: *Reconquista*, *siglo de oro*, and violence. The first chapter will deal with the concept of *Reconquista*, a framework holding double importance. The thinkers detailed here have an especially singular focus on the importance of empire and what they view as the cultural trauma wrought as a result of the loss of the Spanish Empire following the Spanish American War. Furthermore, the name of *Reconquista* is drawn from an actual period of Spanish history called the *Reconquista*, or reconquest, in which Christian forces worked to drive out the Muslim groups who had taken residence in the Iberian Peninsula. These thinkers frequently and often quite explicitly call for a new *Reconquista* and work toward developing a justification and theoretical approach to empire and right, generating a kind of empirical angst, framing their own work in reference to the justifications and historical situatedness of Spain's general conception of right and occupation.

The second chapter will focus in on Ledesma, Giménez Caballero, Albiñana, and the *noventayochistas'* view of the *siglo de oro*, the Spanish golden age of the 16th and 17th century. Part of the golden nature of the golden age was due to the expansiveness and exploratory nature

³⁹ Payne, *Falange*.

of the Spanish Empire of the time. As educated and, in the case of the *noventayochistas*, artistic people, the cultural renaissance and preeminence also characterizing Spain at the time is an ideal by which Spain should seek to restructure itself. Many of the *noventayochistas* view their work and their writings as attempts to generate, once again, a new, preeminent and uniquely Spanish culture and method of expression.

The final chapter will deal with conceptions of violence, specifically with its necessity. I divide the nature of violence in these particular projects in two: militant violence and intellectual violence. First, universally, all members of this group at least implicitly endorse the use of physical violence as an essential means by which to attain their goals, which, when centered around reclamation and governing of empire, also entail violence in governing and administration of physical space. Second, all, most especially the *noventayochistas*, work to establish the new Spanish culture talked about in the second chapter by way of committing what they consider conceptual or intellectual violence, attacking, denouncing, and overthrowing previous ideas of writing and expressing.

On the whole, generating this understanding is a project that has implications beyond a better grasp of the ideas of these particular figures. Fascism studies is a uniquely situated field. While objectivity and intellectual distance are certainly valuable, and indeed at times essential, tools in academic work, the nature of fascism, its logical entailments, and the kinds of actions it, as an ideology, tends to create, should, at least to this author's view, necessitate a non-objective consideration of the conditions of its development, rise and fall. This is not to say that study of fascism should entail fear-mongering or a complete emotional entailment, but taking the modern equivalents to these groups, organizations like Generation Identity, Counter-Currents, or Arktos,

seriously, considering them not just as anomalies, distasteful as they may be, allows us to take a more serious look at the possible implications of their reach and influence.⁴⁰

⁴⁰ Kathleen M. Blee, "White-Knuckle Research: Emotional Dynamics in Fieldwork with Racist Activists," *Qualitative Sociology* 21, no. 4 (1998).

Chapter 1- Back to the Future: *Reconquista* and the Reclamation of Empire

I. Introduction

One of the largest, certainly the largest growing radical right groups across Europe now is the Identitarian movement. The pan-European organization, existing across multiple nations while maintaining a unique nationalism in each particular case, is largely centered around the expulsion of Islam and Muslim peoples from Europe, which they view as a wrongful incursion permitted dually by the European Union and the liberalism of their own national governments.⁴¹ A predominately youth-based movement, even as far back as 2016, the Identitarians have explicitly heralded the concept of reconquest. Its poster project, titled “Faces of Reconquest”⁴² featured images of their supporters and members, proclaiming them the true and sole protectors or real European identity. Political sociologist and scholar of radical politics José Pedro Zúquete explains in his book examining the Identitarian movement,

This comprehensive action of reclamation is, ultimately a work of Reconquest... The newer generation of French Identitarians use such a word, which, in its original Portuguese and Spanish context, referred to reconquering the territory that had been lost to the Arabs... Besides the larger, metaphorical meaning of expulsion of the invaders, this *Reconquista* is also felt as something very concrete that starts in the streets and in fact all public spaces where the presence of a disruptive, threatening and ultimately non-European population is felt.⁴³

The Identitarian movement trades in explicitly on the concept of the *Reconquista*; it is the “foundational moment of Identitarian resistance to the Islamic other.”⁴⁴

⁴¹ José Pedro Zúquete, *The Identitarians: The Movement Against Globalism and Islam in Europe* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press).

⁴² *Visages de la Reconquête*

⁴³ Zúquete, *Identitarians*, 57.

⁴⁴ Zúquete, *Identitarians*, 177.

A good part of Spain's unique perspective on conquest is due to an actual period at the beginning of the history of very early modern Spain called the *Reconquista*, the Reconquering. Starting in the early 700s, around 711 to 718, Christian Visigoth forces began a long series of campaigns designed to wrest control of the peninsula from northern African Islamic forces that had taken residence.⁴⁵ While not necessarily a unified series of resistances against their Islamic counterparts, the Christian revolts against their perceived enemies lasted well into the next several centuries, ending officially in 1492 with the conquest of Granada, eliminating the last Muslim stronghold on the peninsula.⁴⁶ It is perhaps no surprise, then, that such an event serves as an appealing rallying cry for the radical right across the decades, though we will turn more to the specifics of the contemporary radical right later.

While today calls for "reconquest" and the rhetoric of *Reconquista* pervade countries and radical right groups across Europe, the idea of reconquering and reclaiming holds both a different weight and a connotation in Spanish culture, especially during the time of Ledesma, Giménez Caballero, and Albiñana.⁴⁷ The particular development of a rhetoric of reconquering was also closely tied to the idea and desire for the reclamation, not just of the state from the control of the left-leaning Republic but, of the Spanish empire, lands and power to which Ledesma, Giménez Caballero, and Albiñana all felt Spain had a right. The *noventayochistas* also, though their fiction, lauded the height of Spanish empire as the correct goal of government. The idea of *Reconquista* for Ledesma, Giménez Caballero, Albiñana, and the *noventayochistas* is rooted primarily in two defining events: the actual *Reconquista* and, more immediately, the Spanish American War.

⁴⁵ Joseph F. O'Callaghan, *A History of Medieval Spain* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1975).

⁴⁶ O'Callaghan, *History of Medieval Spain*.

⁴⁷ Arthur Herman, *The Idea of Decline in Western History* (New York: The Free Press, 1997).

The expansion of Spain's territory after the *Reconquista* didn't stop at their own borders, however. In the preceding years, Spain's international empire exploded. In 1494, Spain and Portugal signed the Treaty of Tordesillas, establishing their boundaries for imperial expansion and exploration. An imaginary line passing from the north pole to the south running along a point 370 leagues east of the Cape Verde Islands provided to Portugal everything to the east and to Spain everything to the west.⁴⁸ The Treaty of Tordesillas, even while ignoring all of non-Iberian Europe, gave Spain the license to establish what would become, at its peak, one of the world's largest empires, encompassing most of South America, all of Central America and modern Mexico, most of the modern United States, as well as the Philippines, and parts of Europe, Africa, and Oceania.

By the 19th century, however, Spain's hold on its empire was quickly slipping. After the fall of Napoleon, Spain entered into a period of extreme governmental instability. Cycling through new governments and leadership every decade or so, the defining moment of this period for Spanish empire was undoubtedly the Spanish American War in 1898, the event from which the *noventayochistas* take their name. After offering Cuba, one of its last remaining international territories, autonomy, but failing to uphold their agreement, in 1895, Spain faced a Cuban uprising. At this point, the United States had a vested economic interest in Cuban independence or, at the very least, autonomy, and then Spanish Prime Minister Antonio Cánovas del Castillo promised to take decisive action. In 1897, however, he was assassinated. His successor, Práxedes Mateo Sagasta, took office with the need to project strength on both the Cuban and American

⁴⁸ Gottshalk. *The Earliest Diplomatic Documents on America: The Papal Bulls of 1493 and the Treaty of Tordesillas Reproduced and Translated with Historical Introduction and Explanatory Notes*

issue, making a point to frame the issue in as “a matter of Spanish honour.”⁴⁹ While Spain was likely not responsible, the sinking of the American *Maine* prompted tensions to come to a head.

The Spanish-American War lasted for less than ten weeks in total, but, between outmoded military tactics and equipment and major issues with illness (when the United States made landfall in Cuba, much of the Spanish force was already afflicted with yellow fever,) almost 60,000 Spaniards died. Spain surrendered, signing over most of the rest of their international empire to the United States via the Treaty of Paris. In 1899, they sold their last remaining territories to Germany, officially bringing an end to the Spanish Empire.⁵⁰ The loss of the last of the Spanish empire, as well as the relatively humiliating defeat in the Spanish American War was a generationally defining moment for many Spaniards. For the Spanish government, the events helped to spur the establishment of democratic leadership in the form of the Republics and the constitutions establishing the *Cortes*, Spain’s democratic governing body.

For Ledesma, Albiñana, Giménez Caballero, and the *noventayochistas* the decline in empire was untenable.⁵¹ The democratic government was actively standing in the way of the rightful re-establishment of the might of the Spanish empire. The fall of one and the rise of the other could hardly, to their view, be a pure coincidence. This sentiment worked to form the basis of early Spanish nationalism. Pride in Spain came in the valorization of its past and its perceived ability to reclaim its former glory if only led by the proper individuals. It was time for another conquest, another *Reconquista*, to take back control of Spain and restore rule to those that had the best interests of Spain at heart.

⁴⁹ David F. Trask, *The War with Spain in 1898* (New York: Simon and Schuster Inc., 1981).

⁵⁰ Trask, *The War with Spain*.

⁵¹ Ramiro Ledesma Ramos, *Discurso a las juventudes de españa* (Bilbao: Ediciones Fe, 1938).

II. The 13 Pacts

For Giménez Caballero, what he calls “colonial disaster of Spain in 1898” was so definitive a moment that, symbolically, he devotes a section of his book, *The Genius of Spain: Exultations on the Resurrection of the Nation and the World* to identifying the other “98’s” of Spain’s history.⁵² He introduces the 13 events he names as 98’s as those events most important in shaping modern Spain’s history. Every event, or as Giménez Caballero calls them, “pacts,” starting in 1648 when Spain lost colonies to Holland, involves a loss of Spanish imperial control of some colonial holding or another.⁵³ He argues that this loss of colonial control of land Spain had a right to, and, indeed, was best administered under the control of Spain, constitutes the moments in Spanish history, at least as far as the modern Spaniard should be concerned, most crucial in understanding what it is to be Spanish.⁵⁴

Giménez Caballero’s primary goal in examining these moments is to forge a strong national identity for Spain he felt to be lacking. Part of the administrative excellence of Spain came in their pride in administration, a pride derived from the understanding that they had not just a right to rule, but a divine responsibility. While historians now frequently regard the motivating factors behind the start of the *Reconquista* as the pressures of social, economic, and demographic shifts, the prevailing sentiment in Spain at the time, and especially for radical right figures, was that the *Reconquista* was not just a series of battles but an ideologically motivated crusade, beyond which it was one in which Spain was decisively victorious and by which it was able to begin generating a unified cultural image.⁵⁵ It was in 1469, toward the end of the

⁵² E. Giménez Caballero, *Genio del España: Exaltaciones a una resurrección nacional y del mundo*, trans. Zoe Lawson (Madrid: La Gaceta Literaria, 1932), 20.

⁵³ Giménez Caballero, *Genio del España*, 20-28.

⁵⁴ Giménez Caballero, *Genio del España*, 20-28.

⁵⁵ Joseph F. O’Callaghan, *Reconquest and Crusade in Medieval Spain* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003).

Reconquista that the marriage of Queen Isabella I of Castile and King Ferdinand of Aragon united the two kingdoms and produced what is more or less modern Spain as we know it still today. The Catholic Monarchs, as they are frequently known, tied inherently, the right of rule for many Spaniards to that of religion and, as the end of the *Reconquista* approached in 1492, to the military control of the nation.

At its core, the idea of conquering, especially of *reconquering*, is tied to the idea of right: right to rule, right to occupy, right to expand. If one is unjustly or unduly occupied by another force, one then has a right to overthrow them, to unseat them and return to power the rightful rulers which, given their illegitimacy, gives the re-conquerors license, at least in their minds, the right to use whatever means necessary.

The reconquest, re-establishing not just the former colonies of Spain, but the economic, political, and cultural renaissance that followed from the period as well, is not just the right, but the moral obligation of those, as they saw themselves, with the ability to see that such was the case.⁵⁶ The *Reconquista* was to serve as an example for how to re-establish Spanish dominance, for some in a quite literal sense. Giménez Caballero writes,

The Spaniards of the 500s and part of the 600s enjoyed the serenity and pride of their maximality in the world... Yes. The Spanish intellectual identifies the destiny of his home country with the prophecies of the Bible, divine prophecies. And we must recognize in the way of this Maximal Spain, extended across all of the world, and in this companion language of empire, the incarnation of Israel and of Rome: of the divine and of the Empire of History.⁵⁷

⁵⁶ Giménez Caballero, *Genio de España*; “La España que hace: La obra de Sbert,” *La conquista del estado*, Proyecto Filosofía en español, online. <http://www.filosofia.org/hem/193/lce/lce015a.htm>.; “Asistimos sonrientes a la inútil pugna electoral. Queremos cosas muy distintas a esas que se ventilan en las urnas: farsa de señoritos monárquicos y republicanos.” *La conquista del estado*, Proyecto Filosofía en español, online. <http://www.filosofia.org/hem/193/lce/lce051c.htm>.; Miguel de Unamuno y Jugo, *El marqués de Lumbria*, in *Voces de España: Antología Literaria*, ed. Francisca Paredes Méndez, Mark Harpring, and José R. Ballesteros (Boston: Cengage Learning, 2014), 472-483.

⁵⁷ Giménez Caballero, *Genio de España*, 34.

Before the *Reconquista*, Spain lacked a unified version of itself as it did after the loss of its empire. Insofar as colonial territories were the right of Spain, either now independent nations of lands under the control of other areas were being occupied, justifying the kind of armed resistance and reclamation to be found in the *Reconquista* of the 8th through 15th centuries, a reclamation backed by Spain's divine right to rule, a right backed by God himself.

III. The Church and Dictatorship

As traditionally conceived, and as supported by its sanctioning by the papacy as a crusade in the 12th and 13th Centuries, the *Reconquista* was a fundamentally religious endeavor. As was prophesized and supported in the reclamation of Spain during the *Reconquista*, so too now was there a religious imperative for reclamation. This religious imperative to the restoration of Empire was strengthened by external political considerations relating not just to religion but specifically to the Spanish Church as an institution. The original *Reconquista*, if in name only, was tied indelibly for many to the idea of religion.⁵⁸ As the “occupying” forces were predominately Muslim and the “reconquering” forces were predominately Catholic, a deep association with religion was inevitable.⁵⁹

Since the *Reconquista*, through to instances like Alhambra Decree, which expelled all Jewish peoples from all of Spain's territorial holdings, and famously, the Inquisition, and well into modern times, Spain is a deeply institutionally religious country. Beyond adherence to the faith itself, the Church as an institutional power has, at least symbolically, stood as a center of power and influence. In the beginning of the 20th century, alliances between the Church as an organization and anti-Republican forces began to form. Even before their more formal

⁵⁸ O'Callaghan, *Reconquest and Crusade*.

⁵⁹ O'Callaghan, *Reconquest and Crusade*.

association with the Nationalists in the Civil War, the Church supported anti-Republican ideals. After all, “the unGodliness of the Republic justified its destruction, and laborious theological justifications were published...To these were added the powerful image of a martyred church.”⁶⁰

For a clearer view of the anti-clerical stance of the Republics, we can turn forward slightly to the Civil War. Even beyond accusations of hedonism and atheism by the Nationalists to the Republicans, there were clear anti-religion sentiments in the policy and practice of the Republican band in Spain. Beyond the political and evangelical benefits afforded the Church in their alliance with the Nationalists, such a position also afforded them literal physical protection. The atrocities of the Civil War were hardly limited to the Nationalist’s side. In Republican controlled areas. The clergy were regularly subjected to violent persecution. Thousands of church officials, priests, nuns, and the like were tortured and killed in the Republican zones of Spain during the three years of the Civil War, often in quite horrific ways.⁶¹

At least for Giménez Caballero and Albiñana, the anti-clerical stance of the new Republics motivated central claims about the justification for revolution against the reigning Republic. With the Church as an institution on their side, Giménez Caballero in *The Genius of Spain*⁶² and, Albiñana, in his book *Spain Under the Republican Dictatorship (Chronicle of a Putrefied Period)*⁶³, call for the rise of a religious dictatorship, likely drawing from the ideas of

⁶⁰ Mary Vincent, “The Martyrs and the Saints: Masculinity and the Construction of the Francoist Crusade,” *History Workshop Journal* no. 47, 1999, 69.

⁶¹ Juan J. Linz, “Church and State in Spain from the Civil War to the Return of Democracy,” *Daedalus* 120, no. 3 (1991): 159-178.; To clarify for American readers, the opposing sides in the Spanish Civil War were the Nationalists, those attempting the overthrow the democratic Second Republic with Franco as a general, and the Republicans, those in favor of preserving and maintain a republic as their system of governance. In this way, contrary to American conceptions, Republicans were actually the far more liberal coalition.

⁶² Giménez Caballero, *Genio de España*.

⁶³ José María Albiñana, *España bajo la dictadura republicana (crónica de un período putrefacto)* (Madrid: El Financiero, 1932).

conservative political philosopher Juan Donoso Cortés. Donoso Cortés' ideas may be familiar to some through the work of another, more widely known thinker frequented by the radical right, Carl Schmitt, who devotes part of his book *Political Theology* to Donoso Cortés' ideas.⁶⁴

Neither Albiñana nor Giménez Caballero mention Donoso Cortés by name, but both espouse not only similar views, but echo phrases and ideological patterns rooted in Donoso Cortés' work. For Donoso Cortés, if a government is to operate effectively, it must concede that dictatorship is necessary, and, in order for that dictatorship to be effective, it must be absolute and its leader must be infallible, akin to God Himself.⁶⁵ He writes,

If God is the legislator of the physical world, are men the legislators of human societies, but in a different way? Does God always govern by the same laws he has imposed upon himself, according to his divine wisdom, and to which he has subjected us? No, gentlemen... So, gentlemen, when God operates in this way, can it not be said, if human language can be applied to divine things, that he is operating dictatorially? Gentlemen, this proves just how great is the delirium of a party that believes it can govern with less means than God, dispensing with the use of dictatorship. But dictatorship is sometimes necessary.⁶⁶

In this way, dictatorship is divine, good, and necessarily infallible, the conditions from which it can draw its power. Dictatorship is religiously sanctioned, the governing choice of God and, as such, is therefore also able, or should work to, create for its leadership a position in which the word of the leadership is functionally the same as the word of God.

It is important for Donoso Cortés that man is governed in the way of God not simply because of the infallibility of God but because of the fallibility of man. Having, quite simply, zero faith in humanity, Donoso Cortés felt that, as all man was born in original sin, their ability to be anything but the worst version of themselves was limited, writing, "The reptile that I step

⁶⁴ Carl Schmitt, "On the Counterrevolutionary Philosophy of the State," in *Political Theology*, ed. George Schwab (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2018).

⁶⁵ Juan Donoso Cortés, "Speech on Dictatorship," trans. Jeffrey P. Johnson, *Selected Works of Juan Donoso Cortés* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press).

⁶⁶ Donoso Cortés, "Speech on Dictatorship," 48.

on with my feet, is, to my eyes, less despicable than man.”⁶⁷ Authoritarianism is justified insofar as humanity cannot be trusted.

Albiñana echoes Donoso Cortés’ ideas almost explicitly. While the title of his book *Spain Under the Republican Dictatorship*, would seem to imply that he is anti-dictatorial, in the tradition of many other figures in the radical right, his problem with his perceived opponents is that they do not take their respective ideas far enough. The problem is not that the Republic is a dictatorship (which, to clarify in a factual historical sense, it was, at least functionally, not, certainly not in the sense Albiñana implies herein) or with dictatorship in general, but that it was an illegitimate and ineffective dictatorship. A dictatorship, Albiñana argues, must “be of and like God.”⁶⁸ For Giménez Caballero, the weakness of the Republic is in its failure to “recognize its Godliness.”⁶⁹ Both men echo the sentiments and wording of Donoso Cortés in this respect. It is this influence that can help to understand another crucial aspect of their attempts to develop their ideologies.

For both Giménez Caballero and Albiñana, Spain had a religious imperative both for reclamation and dictatorship that would help to bring about a true rebirth of rightful Spanish control and power. These ideas are only further reinforced by what they perceive to be the pernicious attempts of the Republics to distance Spain from the Catholic Church. For Albiñana especially, however, the religious aspects of Spain’s rebirth were a crucial part of the particular way in which Spanish nationalism might experience its rebirth. Donoso Cortés’ work argues that there are two axes on which an individual may be oppressed: politics and religion.⁷⁰ Some

⁶⁷ As quoted in Schmitt, “Counterrevolutionary Philosophy,” 58, trans. Zoe Lawson.

⁶⁸ Jose María Albiñana, *España bajo la dictadura republicana (Cronica de un period putrefacto)* (Madrid: El financiero, 1933).

⁶⁹ Giménez Caballero, *Genio de España*.

⁷⁰ Donoso Cortés, “Speech on Dictatorship.”

oppression on both axes is necessary for the legitimacy of a government and especially for its success and longevity.⁷¹ The levels of oppression on either axis, however, must be counterbalanced. If a regime is especially politically repressive, there must be relatively less religious oppression. If a regime is particularly religiously oppressive, it must grant slightly greater political freedom.⁷² In this way, the legitimacy of a regime is based not on heredity or inheritance but its respective ability to repress.⁷³

Albiñana's critique of the Republic is centered on this idea of imbalance and repression. Part of the peculiarity of figures like Albiñana, Ledesma, and Giménez Caballero is rooted in their chronological emergence. These men started working and writing well before the emergence of a strong, or indeed, before any real, sense of Spanish nationalism, in part why many of Albiñana's early political endeavors failed to gain any real traction.⁷⁴ While Albiñana and his compatriots viewed the loss of Spanish empire as a tragedy, an insult, much of Spain "had been too deeply sunk in economic sloth and governmental incompetence to nourish positive ambitions. Her wars and territories had been lost either too long ago or too far away to excite popular feelings."⁷⁵ Rather than actively working to exercise a legitimate power of oppression as it should, the Spanish Republic, in Albiñana's eyes, was simply ignoring and mismanaging the Spanish people, choosing inaction, the exact opposite of what it should do.

The lack of political action and motivation by the Spanish government, coupled with the generally expanded political rights of the average Spaniard under the Republic meant, under Donoso Cortés' framework with which Albiñana seems to have been aligned, there was a lack of

⁷¹ Donoso Cortés, "Speech on Dictatorship."

⁷² Donoso Cortés, "Speech on Dictatorship."

⁷³ Juan Donoso Cortés, *Ensayo sobre el Catolicismo, el Liberalismo y el Socialismo*, Biblioteca Virtual Universal, <https://www.biblioteca.org.ar/libros/70792.pdf>.

⁷⁴ Payne, *Falange*.

⁷⁵ Payne, *Falange*, 4.

political repression. If the Republic was to remain a tenable government, they surely must have then increased oppression of religion. While the Church institutionally had less overt influence on and even opposed the Republic, actual conditions were far from what one would call religious oppression. The balance between the two conditions was far off, leaving the Spanish to languish under an ineffective and inadequately repressive governing body. Albiñana highlights this idea in the most oft sighted portion of *Spain Under the Republican Dictatorship*, an image he titles, ironically, “The Joy of the Republic.” The photograph features a group of men presumably in line for food, captioned, “The hungry, unemployed laborers forming a long line at the door of the San Francisco Barracks, waiting to eat leftovers from the ranch.”⁷⁶ Left to their own devices and without proper direction from the government, citizens are left to ultimately suffer. Albiñana goes so far as to dedicate his book, a dedication emblazoned under the image of a bold cross, to the “thousands of victims of the Republic,” who died either as a result of its incompetence or who languish as its “prisoners,” and to “Spanish patriots” working to fight against despotism.⁷⁷

It is then up to the political and religious forces standing in opposition to such injustices to rebalance the proper kinds of oppression needed to form a government of which Spain is worthy. In the same way Christian forces fought off the occupation of the Moors in the *Reconquista*, Albiñana, Giménez Caballero, and their compatriots have not just a religious and political sanction (in terms of the approval of the Church as an institution, a broader religious commitment, and the necessity of political reform) but a religious and political mandate to take back, to reconquer, restructure, and reunify that which is rightfully theirs, both within Spain and without.

⁷⁶ Albiñana, *España bajo la dictadura*.

⁷⁷ Albiñana, *España bajo la dictadura*.

Albiñana and Giménez Caballero very explicitly viewed their respective projects as avenues for wresting back control, restoring a correct right of rule and expansion. This is further, and perhaps no better demonstrated than in Ledesma's publication, literally called *La conquista del estado*, or *The Conquest of the State*. For its first few years, Giménez Caballero was also a regular contributor to *La Conquista*.⁷⁸ Beyond the titular reference to conquest, the weekly periodical featured essays and articles by Ledesma as well as those from contributors examining the strengths of the rising international fascist movements, the decline of Spain, and the ways in which Spain could return to its former glory.⁷⁹

Giménez Caballero furthered more explicitly in *The Genius of Spain*. For Giménez Caballero, the world, at least Spain's former colonies, were most properly administered by Spain. When Spain lost their empire, beyond losing power and influence, Spain's colonies lost their proper administrator.⁸⁰ While Spain may not have been as militarily or economically powerful as nations like England or Germany, it was able to draw its power from empire, and "sacrificing" its empire as it had done in recent decades was its greatest mistake.⁸¹ The "genius of Spain" was that it had the ability to manage an expansive and diverse empire in a way that vexed other nations, making it uniquely situated to once again become the world's greatest power if only those standing in the way in Spain's government would let the nation fulfill what Giménez Caballero felt was its eventual destiny.⁸²

Beyond his own writing, Giménez Caballero also ran and edited *La gaceta literaria*, The Literary Gazette, in which he published works from notable Spanish authors (also including

⁷⁸ "El señor Giménez Caballero ya no pertenece a <<La Conquista del Estado>>," *La conquista del estado*, Proyecto Filosofía en español, online. <http://www.filosofia.org/hem/193/lce/lce071a.htm>.

⁷⁹ *La conquista*, filosofia.org.

⁸⁰ Giménez Caballero, *Genio de España*.

⁸¹ Giménez Caballero, *Genio de España*.

⁸² Giménez Caballero, *Genio de España*.

Ledesma). Giménez Caballero's focus not just on the purely political aspects of the reconquest of Spain was rooted in his belief that much of Spain's strength came from their position as a cultural leader in the world as well.⁸³ Providing an avenue by which Spanish artists could publish and refine their craft provided an avenue by which to foster Spanish cultural hegemony once more. It is this focus on artistic and cultural rebirth and revolution that will be the focus of our next chapter, dealing with the preoccupation on and influence of the *siglo del oro*, or Spanish Golden Age.

⁸³ "Los intelectuales y la política," *La conquista del estado*, Proyecto Filosofía en español, online. <http://www.filosofia.org/hem/193/lce/lce053a.htm>.

Chapter 2 - Gold Standard: The *Siglo de Oro* and Spain's Cultural Potential

I. Introduction

In the founding manifesto of the Italian neo-fascist group CasaPound, they call for “the sparking of a *new* golden age as a mobilizing myth, as an adventurous, daring, and ultimately aesthetic creation.”⁸⁴ The same kinds of ideas come up in the works of French and Greek radical right groups as well. In fact, one of the central features of all Identitarian movements is the remarketing and appropriation of the symbols of old in a way so as to make them new again, to take the forms of the old and regenerate and recreate them so as to understand them and their respective cultures as new again.⁸⁵ It “wants not to go back in time...but to re-create the ancestral sources, virtues, and values of Europeans in modern times...Tradition, therefore, must be continually re-created.”⁸⁶ Many traditional conceptualizations of fascisms and proto-fascisms frame their revanchist tendencies as an attempt to literally return to or rebirth an age of the past. In a closer examination of many of the groups, this tendency, however, seems typically less focused on the rebirth of a situation than an attitude, a creative and generative potential, a rhetoric we can find rooted in our fascist heralds.

The inexorable call for a return to some past glory for the figures examined herein does not stop with a return to history as with empire and *Reconquista* alone. Indelibly tied to the loss of empire that plagued this period of Spanish history was, for many, also a feeling of loss of culture, specifically of cultural supremacy. The extent and power of the Spanish empire of the 15th through 17th centuries brought with it cultural prosperity and influence as well, a period

⁸⁴ Zúquete, *Identitarians*, 51.

⁸⁵ Zúquete, *Identitarians*, 51-53.

⁸⁶ Zúquete, *Identitarians*, 14.

thinkers, writers, and artists of the time sought to revive, either with or without the reclamation of territory. The myriad resources and capabilities of imperial Spain saw a cultural flourishing commonly known as the *siglo de oro*, literally the century of gold, or more commonly, the Spanish Golden Age.⁸⁷ Beyond purely economic prosperity, Spain saw massive advancements in the development of architecture, literature, philosophy, and art. The relative power of Spain helped to facilitate the influence and popular uptake of such forms even outside of the peninsula.

The impact of these developments is still widely felt, if not always consciously acknowledged through today. Antonio de Debríja published the first comprehensive grammar of Castilian, providing an avenue for cultural unity and development previously unavailable. Patronage from the Spanish Habsburgs facilitated a renaissance of art, music, and architecture boasting figures like El Greco, Diego Velázquez, Tomás Luis de Victoria, and Francisco Guerrero. With the publication of *Don Quixote* in 1605, largely considered the first modern novel, Miguel de Cervantes firmly established Spain's place in the international literary canon. Other writers and thinkers like Lope de Vega, a playwright and impossibly prolific father of the modern *comedia*, Garcilaso de la Vega, a poet who brought Renaissance poetry to Spain, and Teresa d'Ávila, a nun and philosopher, who, it is now thought, was greatly and directly influential in the development of the ideas of Rene Descartes, were also active during this time.⁸⁸ This period of expansion, prosperity, and culture, historians generally agree, ended in 1681 with the death of writer Calderón de la Barca.⁸⁹

⁸⁷ Antonio Domínguez Ortiz, *Golden Age of Spain: 1516-1659* (New York: Basic Books Inc. Publishers, 1971).

⁸⁸ Christia Mercer, "Descartes' Debt to Teresa of Ávila, or Why We Should Work on Women in the History of Philosophy," *Philosophical Studies* 174, no. 10, (2017): 2539-2555.

⁸⁹ Domínguez Ortiz, *Golden Age of Spain*.

The strength of the *siglo de oro*, at least in terms of the projects of Ledesma, Giménez Caballero, Albiñana, and the *noventayochistas*, came in terms of its uniquely and comprehensively Spanish nature.⁹⁰ It was Spain that was leading, not just in empire, but in creative and intellectual productivity and influence. Cervantes created a form of writing still used and modeled as the ideal still today, with *Don Quixote* treated as a masterwork of satire and comedy, one that remains entertaining, accessible, and relevant over four centuries later. d'Ávila is still, and is now becoming more widely read, her book *The Interior Castle* treated as a classic of philosophy.⁹¹ The works of El Greco (although Greek working and taking cues almost entirely from Spain) and Velazquez were massively influential among their contemporaries and on artists since.

Enter the *noventayochistas*. The “Generation of 98” were a group composed of poets, novelists, essayists, and playwrights opposed to the contemporary rule of Spain and what they viewed as the general complacency of the Spanish people.⁹² The term coined by José Martínez Ruiz, a member of the group, calls back to Spain’s loss in the Spanish-American War in 1898 and the profound impact of the event on this generation of thinkers. While not necessarily intentionally, those generally classed in the group were born in the 1870s and published most of their major works in the first two decades of the 20th century.⁹³ Their views, although not entirely cohesive, are largely predicated on the double failure of both democratic and monarchical

⁹⁰ While Ledesma and Albiñana are somewhat concerned with the reinstatement of Spanish cultural hegemony, the central focus of this chapter is a literary, artistic, and aesthetic one. As such, while the relative attention on the *noventayochistas* and contemporary artists and on the literary work of Giménez Caballero should not be read as suggesting that the others are not concerned with aesthetic or artistic considerations, their relative importance is significantly less in this regard.

⁹¹ Mercer, “Descartes’ Debt.”

⁹² Henry Kamen, *Imagining Spain: Historical Myth & National Identity* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008).

⁹³ Raymond Carr, *Spain, 1808-1939* (Oxford University Press, 1966).

governments to deliver Spain from its cultural and economic woes.⁹⁴ Heavily modernist, these writers worked to reconceptualize traditional conceptions of writing and expression and form a new, newly Spanish form.

Even insofar as many fascist and radical right groups openly denounced many facets and the aesthetics of modernism, analyses linking modernism and the radical right abound.⁹⁵ Most analysis of such figures, while not incorrectly, focuses primarily on literary analysis. While not devoid of exploration of political concerns, they focus largely on the implicit (and often explicit) calls for rebellion or solely on the allegorical critiques of Restoration and praise of traditionalism. Although this framework of understanding is valuable and is not wrong in itself, it ignores the larger, often as important, meta considerations about the role the authors intended their works to play. Their work to redefine or transcend the bounds of genre and writing were largely and often conscious efforts to create a new Spanish golden age. As we will see through our analysis, even insofar as they at times explicitly disavowed fascism and radical right ideas, in itself serves as a valorization of the very same ideas to which fascisms adhere. Their work, while not calling back to the literal regeneration of a past age as is so often assumed of fascisms and proto-fascisms instead works to recreate the generative spirit of those ages, to redefine, reconceptualize, and otherwise expand (or do away with entirely) traditional conceptions of genre and expression.

While they may not have been as widely or popularly successful as they may have hoped, in themselves, they were, classed as the progenitors of the Spanish Silver Age.⁹⁶ While there are about a dozen writers generally considered a part of the *noventayochistas*, here, we are going to

⁹⁴ Carr, *Spain*.

⁹⁵ Roger Griffin, *Modernism and Fascism*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillian, 2007).

⁹⁶ Carr, *Spain*.

primarily consider the writings of two of the most prominent: Miguel de Unamuno y Jugo and Antonio Machado.

I. Unamuno and *la novela*

Primarily and proudly an intellectual, Unamuno was highly educated in Greek, Latin, and philosophy, working proudly as a professor of Greek and later as the rector of the University of Salamanca for thirty years, a career interrupted only by his forced removal by Miguel Primo de Rivera.⁹⁷ Writing novels, plays, poems, and essays, Unamuno wrote extensively, importantly here, working explicitly in reference to, in his view, continue the work of Cervantes, one of the key figures of the *siglo de oro*. Specifically, we can look here at Unamuno's *Tres novelas ejemplares y un prólogo*, *Three Exemplary Novels and a Prologue*, and *Niebla*, translated alternatively as *Mist* or *Fog*.

Tres novelas ejemplares immediately presents an oblique reference to the works of Cervantes, who himself authored several stories classed as *Novelas ejemplares*, or *Exemplary Novels* (as in those which set an example,) short stories all intended to communicate a central moral lesson. Unamuno works to build on the ideas of Cervantes and Cervantes' conception of the novel. In the preface to his *Novelas*, Cervantes writes

My genius and my inclination prompt me to this kind of writing; the more so as I consider (and with truth) that I am the first who has written novels in the Spanish language, though many have hitherto appeared among us, all of them translated from foreign authors. But these are my own, neither imitated nor stolen from anyone; my genius has engendered them, my pen has brought them forth, and they are growing up in the arms of the press.⁹⁸

⁹⁷ Julián Marías, *Miguel de Unamuno*, trans. Frances M. López-Morillas (Boston: Harvard University Press, 1966).

⁹⁸ Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra, *Novelas Ejemplares de Cervantes*, trans. Walter K. Kelly (Project Gutenberg, 2008).

Beyond arguing and confirming that he was the first to write a novel, Cervantes lays out here a key distinction and shift in literary style. Specifically, rather than the idea that the plot and content of a story is either a reflection of some religious ideal or condition or a faithful account of the conditions of the world, Cervantes' conception of the novel is neither. Instead, the novel is born of his own mind and ideas, relaying an idea rather than the real or religious.

Unamuno worked to continue this tradition.⁹⁹ More directly, Unamuno was a forerunner of the modernist movement and stood in direct opposition to the strict realism that dominated the world of Spanish (and much of European) literature at the time. Instead of working to faithfully recount the world around him, Unamuno viewed writing, poetry, drama, fiction, or otherwise, as a way to express a deeper internal truth, one born of writing as an expression of the internal self, a conception likely heavily influenced by Unamuno's abiding interest and sympathy for the ideas of Søren Kierkegaard.¹⁰⁰ To such an end, in the same way Cervantes developed the modern conception of the *novela*, novel, Unamuno creates his own, new version: the *nivola*. He first introduces the idea in his prologue to his book *Niebla*, and more directly as the oft excluded subtitle, and further develops it in the prologue to *Tres novelas ejemplares*.¹⁰¹

A *nivola*, a made-up word playing on both the Spanish word for novel, *novela*, and level, *nivel*, is a new "level" of writing, a new way of considering form itself as Unamuno conceives

⁹⁹ Unamuno's valorization and borderline obsession with Cervantes, and indeed his consideration that he was more or less a modern-day Cervantes, is so well known that it is actually the subject of a short story by Argentinian author Jorge Luis Borges, in which he pokes fun at Unamuno's emulation of the Golden Age author. The story follows a French author named Pierre Menard who, rather than seeking to simply translate the story of *Don Quijote*, instead so immerses himself in it, living as would have Cervantes so as to reproduce the story organically line for line. See Jorge Luis Borges, "Pierre Menard, autor del Quijote," in *Ficciones* (New York: Vintage Español, 2012), 39-53. And Paul Stephen Hyland, "Reading as Rewriting: Miguel de Unamuno, Jorge Luis Borges, and the *Quijote*," University of Cambridge, Trinity College, 2018.

¹⁰⁰ Marías, *Miguel de Unamuno*.

¹⁰¹ Miguel de Unamuno, *Niebla (Nivola)* (Madrid: Renacimiento, 1914). ; Miguel de Unamuno, *Tres novelas ejemplares y un prólogo* (Madrid-Barcelona: Calpe, 1920).

it.¹⁰² The *nivola*, per Unamuno's definition, is characterized primarily by four things: a lack of traditional form in favor of a focus on larger ideas, characters primarily defined by a single heightened trait, a firm distance from the actual conditions of the world, and a speed of construction, being primarily conceived, written, and finalized in relatively little time.¹⁰³

Unamuno explains,

Such is the novel, like an epic or drama, a blueprint; but then the novel, the epic or the drama imposes itself on the ideas of the author. Or the characters, these supposed creations, impose themselves on him. Like the imposition of Lucifer and Satan, first, and then Adam and Eve, later, to Jehovah. And this is the *nivola*, not the novel, the *trigidy*, not the tragedy! ... This bright idea to call it a *nivola* is not entirely mine, as I say, but is a brilliant trick to intrigue the critics. This is as much of a novel as any other would be... Just like novels that lived long ago, the novel shall live once again. The story is to reconceive it.¹⁰⁴

Unamuno initiates this reconceptualization in *Niebla*. The *nivola* follows Augusto, a rich, dissatisfied, intelligent man who falls in love with Eugenia, a poor woman in love with another man, Mauricio. Although Augusto tries to win Eugenia over, all his advances only put her off more. Meanwhile, Augusto begins a relationship with Rosario and begins to doubt his feelings for Eugenia. When the opportunity presents itself, however, he still proposes to Eugenia, who accepts. Days before they are set to be married, Eugenia runs off with Mauricio. Augusto decides to kill himself.¹⁰⁵ Before doing so, he decides it is best to consult Unamuno who had written an article on suicide. Unamuno explains to Augusto that he is not, in fact, real, and is just a character Unamuno created and, therefore, he cannot kill himself. Augusto proclaims, uncertainly, that he does exist, and that even if he did not, there is nothing to say Unamuno is not also some character in a dream of God. Augusto returns to his home and dies, either by killing

¹⁰² Unamuno, *Niebla*.

¹⁰³ Agnes Moncy, *La creación del personaje en Miguel de Unamuno* (Santander: La Isla de los Ratones, 1963).

¹⁰⁴ Unamuno, *Niebla*.

¹⁰⁵ Unamuno, *Niebla*.

himself or being killed by Unamuno himself, a point of some debate in analysis of the story.

Unamuno considers bringing Augusto back but decides not to, instead allowing Augusto's dog, Orfeo, to deliver a eulogy for the fallen character.¹⁰⁶

The primary focus of *Niebla* centers on questions of existence, reality, and what it is to be alive. The actual story of the novel, as per the form of the *nivola*, is secondary, serving more as a vehicle to present ideas than as the central feature of the text. Certainly, and obviously, the work does not present a reflection of the real world. These reconceptualizations help Unamuno to work toward, as his name for the concept implies, even if he does not give it as much credit as it perhaps deserves, developing a new, uniquely Spanish cultural artifact, one useful in the consideration of what it is to be. As his life progressed, Unamuno's belief in the cultural potential of Spain only strengthened. While at the time of writing *Tres novelas ejemplares* and *Niebla*, Unamuno generally believed that Spain would be best off if it were to collaborate and increase ties, cultural or otherwise, with the rest of Europe, eventually, he came to believe more completely in the cultural prominence of Spain.¹⁰⁷ There was, in Unamuno's view, something singularly important, unique, and valuable about the culture of Spain that prolonged or extended interaction with other cultures would pollute or limit Spain's potential.¹⁰⁸

The re-creation of the novel, the creation of the *nivola*, as well as more direct influence by and reference to Cervantes, firmly establishes Unamuno's commitment to the regeneration of Spain, specifically to the return of the *siglo de oro*. Through a kind of violence, a destruction of prior forms, Unamuno worked, rather successfully to create a new Spanish literary renaissance complete with his own Cervantine creation of novel (in both senses of the word) form.

¹⁰⁶ Unamuno, *Niebla*.

¹⁰⁷ Marías, *Miguel de Unamuno*.

¹⁰⁸ Marías, *Miguel de Unamuno*.

Politically speaking, although lauding the culturally authority of Spain in his personal letters and implicitly in his writings, Unamuno was a fairly outspoken critic of the dictatorships off both General Primo de Rivera (for which he temporarily lost his position at the university of Salamanca,) and Franco after witnessing his brutal tactics. Unamuno was not party affiliated or dictatorially focused or motivated. Indeed, outside of his personal letters and his praise for Spain's cultural purity therein, there is nothing inherently proto-fascist or particularly political about much of his work. Taken together, however, the argument is clear. From cultural preeminence to the lamentation of decline we saw in *El marques de Lumbria*, these considerations are a part of Unamuno's writing whether he intended it or not, a point we will address in further detail later.

II. Machado and the Decline of Spain

We will turn to another one of the *noventayochistas*, one focused in on the many of the same things as Unamuno. Antonio Machado was a Spanish poet and writer. Intensely focused on decline, much of his work figures abandoned places like parks or gardens, places once great and full of life, production, and culture now fallen from grace.¹⁰⁹ Among his most famous works, *Campos de Castilla*, or *Fields of Castile*, includes a number of poems lamenting the decline literally of the countryside, of Castile, with clear allusion to the state of Spain at the time.¹¹⁰

The idea of the falling of Spain is evident in Machado's poem, "Por tierras de España."¹¹¹ The poem laments the fall of "el hombre de estos campos," "the man of these fields," a farmer,

¹⁰⁹ Arthur Terry, *Antonio Machado - Campos de Castilla: Critical Guides to Spanish Texts* (Grant and Cutler, 1973).

¹¹⁰ Antonio Machado, *Campos de Castilla* (Madrid: Catedra, 2006).

¹¹¹ Machado, *Campos*, trans. Zoe Lawson.

deeply connected to the land now war hungry, given to vice and violence.¹¹² He is but a “esclava de los siete pecados capitales,” a “slave to the seven deadly sins.”¹¹³ As with the fall of the Garden of Eden, who Machado asserts could well have been where he writes, and cursed by “la sombra de Caín,” “the shadow of Caine,” a once great land and its people have fallen from grace.¹¹⁴

Machado continues a similar idea in his *Proverbios y cantares*, or *Proverbs and Songs*. A numbered series of poems, quite famously in LIII, Machado presents the idea of “Ser de España,” or the “two Spains,” one that dies and one that yawns.¹¹⁵ He writes,

There is today Spaniard who wants to / live and begins to live, / between a
Spain dying / and another Spain yawning. / Little Spaniard, just coming now
/ into the world, may God keep you. / One of those two Spains / has to freeze
your heart.¹¹⁶

Referencing the political turmoil bubbling in Spain between the Catholic nationalist groups and the anti-clerical more traditionally progressive group, Machado presents the situation as hopeless. After the deposition of Isabella II and through to the 1910s when Machado was writing, the two sides, to his view, existed as much to oppose each other as they did for any particular thing. No matter who arose to fill the void of power in Spain, the people of Spain would have to suffer.¹¹⁷ Unamuno presents a nearly identical idea in his short story, “Rebeca,” in which the Biblical figures Jacob and Esau fight for space in their mother’s womb.¹¹⁸

What is to blame for this decline and this conflict, at least as far as Machado is concerned? Spain has, to his view, become too opulent, too focused on itself. While his exact focus differs, there is a decidedly religious bent to Machado’s conception of the rise of Spain.

¹¹² Machado, *Campos*, trans. Zoe Lawson.

¹¹³ Machado, *Campos*, trans. Zoe Lawson.

¹¹⁴ Machado, *Campos*, trans. Zoe Lawson.

¹¹⁵ Antonio Machado, *Proverbios y cantares*, trans. Zoe Lawson (El Pais, 2003).

¹¹⁶ Antonio Machado, “LIII,” in *Proverbios y cantares*, trans. Zoe Lawson (El Pais, 2003).

¹¹⁷ Pedro Laín Entralgo, *La generación del noventa y ocho* (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe S.A., 1967).

¹¹⁸ Miguel de Unamuno, “Rebeca” (1914).

The nation's delivery is biblical, prophesized, though not necessarily inevitable without the work and rise of consciousness of the people. Breaking with Ledesma and Giménez Caballero, however, Machado feels as though part of the reason of the decline of Spain is not simply the loss of empire. Instead, the loss of empire, the decline in cultural power and production, and the economic and political woes of Spain are due to the nation's hubris, its opulence.¹¹⁹

While some of this reasoning is perhaps due to the almost Taoist views Machado eventually adopted, Machado, unlike many of the other figures we examined, viewed modern society as overly decadent, too focused on consumption and production. The central figure in "Por tierras de España" works to "fire the pine forests / and its plunder awaits like the spoils of war, / where once there stood the black holm oaks, / he fells the sturdy trees of his saw."¹²⁰ While he does not seem to view modernity as a bad thing in and of itself, its need for consumption, or more specifically the need for expansion for expansion's sake, is not as present, and is, as seen above, at times directly stands opposed to many of the views we have examined thus far. This does not, however, place Machado in a different camp. He is still decidedly a member of this group for reasons, as with Unamuno above, we will examine shortly.

III. Dalí and The Golden Age

While this final figure is not technically a member of the *noventayochistas*, instead belonging to a different Spanish artistic movement, the Generation of 27, they are so clear an example of valorization of the golden age, the revival of Spanish culture, and even quite literal adherence to the ideals of radical right thinking that an examination of their work is certainly worth bringing to bear. Salvador Dalí is, with the possible exception of Pablo Picasso, the most

¹¹⁹ Machado, *Campos*.

¹²⁰ Machado, *Campos*.

well-known artist of any kind to come out of Spain at this time. Not born until 1904, Dalí was much younger than many of the major figures working this time, but, starting young, he rose to prominence in the mid-1920s.¹²¹ Classically trained, Dalí always had a reverence and grounding in classical and renaissance artists, even going so far as to model his own iconic moustache off that of Velazquez, one of the central artistic figures of the *siglo de oro*.

Dalí's eccentricity and generally flippant treatment of just about everything generally draws into question the authenticity of any of his views on any subject (except, perhaps, his own psychology.)¹²² That being said, there are two particular areas where further analysis can be fruitful and his positions undeniable: his politics and one of films, *L'Age d'Or*, literally, *The Golden Age*.

The exact nature and precise commitments of Dalí's political leanings are not entirely clear, as it often seems he espoused political views as much to show his commitments as to simply annoy and provoke those around him. That being said, he repeatedly worked with radical right and fascist groups, commitments that complicated his artistic connections. He was even, occasionally, a contributor to Giménez Caballero's *La gaceta literaria*.¹²³ Initially drawn to Dadaism, a radical and absurd artistic school born out of the destruction wrought by World War I, Dalí's right wing beliefs and the generally left-wing bent of much of Dadaism left to two at odds.¹²⁴ Dalí, along with another artist André Breton, pivoted toward the rising school of surrealism. Dalí's vocal support for Hitler and refusal to denounce Franco's brutality in his own country unlike the other Spanish surrealists, including Picasso, led to a "trial" in 1934 that nearly

¹²¹ Meredith Etherington-Smith, *The Persistence of Memory: A Biography of Dalí* (New York: Random House, 1992).

¹²² Etherington-Smith, *The Persistence of Memory*.

¹²³ Salvador Dalí, "Film-arte Fil antiartistico," in *La Gaceta Literaria*, no. 24, December 15, 1927, 5.

¹²⁴ Etherington-Smith, *The Persistence of Memory*.

led to Dalí's expulsion from the Surrealist movement, ultimately formally expelled in 1939 by Breton.¹²⁵ Dalí's commitment to the Franco regime did not stop with simply not denouncing his policies. In fact, Dalí presented Franco himself with a painting of his daughter, Carmen Bordiu Franco, as a gift and as a show of support.¹²⁶

More directly for our purposes, Dalí also co-wrote a film with another Spanish Surrealist and artist Luis Buñuel, called *L'Age d'Or*, a literal (albeit satirical) reference to the *siglo de oro*. Much like Machado, the film laments the opulence and excess of modern society. While the film begins with a seemingly unrelated extended cut of a documentary about scorpions, the film centers on the repeated and constantly failing attempts of a young couple to consummate their relationship. In a surrealist fashion all attempts are absurd and exaggerated, the couple being thwarted successively by the forces of religion, their families, and society at large.¹²⁷ The film ends with another unrelated story about an orgy in a castle, referencing repeatedly and directly the story of Sodom, further solidifying the creator's view on the relationship between excess and decline.¹²⁸

¹²⁵ Etherington-Smith, *The Persistence of Memory*; It should be noted here that many art historians and those who have studied Dalí's life believe that it may be just as likely that Dalí was driven from the Surrealist movement because the liability posed by his unpredictability and antics and because of a personal feud with André Breton. Given his repeated commitment to such ideas, however, as well as outstanding biographical information, it is the view of this particular author, that at least somewhat, Dalí honestly and truly held fascist and radical right sentiments. Even if one is not convinced by such an argument, his association with the rise of the Falange in Spain and literal lending of an aesthetic quality to their movement, as we have seen with the examples of Machado and Unamuno through the lens of Sontag still warrant his inclusion in this analysis.

¹²⁶ Etherington-Smith, *The Persistence of Memory*.

¹²⁷ Salvador Dalí and Luis Buñuel, *L'Age d'Or*, directed by Luis Buñuel (1930; France: Corinth Films, 1979).

¹²⁸ Dalí and Buñuel, *L'Age d'Or*.

Buñuel and Dalí both viewed the work of the Surrealists as the generation, in the same way we say in the case of Unamuno, as generating a new form of expression by way of destroying the old. Buñuel explained specifically in his autobiography

All of us were supporters of a certain concept of revolution, and although the Surrealists didn't consider themselves terrorists, they were constantly fighting a society they despised. Their principal weapon wasn't guns, of course; it was scandal. Scandal was a potent agent of revelation, capable of exposing such social crimes as the exploitation of one man by another, colonial imperialism, religious tyranny – in sum all the secret and odious under-pinnings of a system had to be destroyed. The real purpose of Surrealism was not to create a new literary, artistic, or even philosophical movement, but to explode the social order, to transform life itself.¹²⁹

While Buñuel furthers that many Surrealists abandoned the artistic side of their revolution for rising Communist parties, Dalí took the same idea in the opposite direction, fighting instead with and for “exploitation of one man by another, colonial imperialism, religious tyranny.”¹³⁰ Buñuel, on the other hand, despite his close friendship with Dalí, held opposed political views, working as a propagandist for the Republic during the Civil War. Both men, however, took the idea of regeneration of culture very seriously.

IV. The Aesthetics of Ideology

How can it be said, beyond, and in the case of Unamuno's opposition to Franco and the rise of Fascism in Spain in spite of biography, that these authors and artists and, more importantly for our purposes, their works actually constitute kinds of heralds of fascism? To better understand, we can turn to Susan Sontag's *Under the Sign of Saturn*, specifically, “Fascinating Fascism.” Here, Sontag addresses the relationship between aesthetic and ideology,

¹²⁹ Luis Buñuel, *My Last Sigh* (New York: 1983), 107.

¹³⁰ Buñuel, *My Last Sigh*, 107.

specifically, the interplay between the belief and image and between image and belief.¹³¹ She begins by countering the claims of Leni Riefenstahl, most well known for her film *Triumph of the Will*, that she was never a Nazi, but an artist, seeking to make art and simply finding herself with an unfortunately fascist subject. Sontag counters, arguing that even her films before working with the Nazi party directly and her works of photography valorizing the Nuba, a tribe in Sudan, still laud and celebrate the kinds of bodies and ideals that are central to National Socialism.¹³² Even though Riefenstahl may claim distance or artistic vision, the values imbued in her work are inexorably bound to ideological considerations. The National Socialist Party valorized strength, virility, and even if Riefenstahl's later work does not include the kind of immediately recognizable imagery like the iron cross or swastikas, Sontag explains, that does not mean that she is not valorizing the ideals at the center of the ideology on a deeper level.

As discussed previously, ideology, as a consideration, is all consuming. It is a way of viewing and considering the world in all ways and at all times. Ideological considerations then, even those not fully developed, will inevitably work their way into artistic expressions, literary, dramatic, poetic, or visual so long as that art seeks to celebrate that which an ideology hails and to denigrate that which it fears or opposes. While there are any number of definitions of fascism, and Unamuno, Machado, and Dalí were not fully or entirely fascist themselves, their work seems to venerate ideas and values in a way consistent with general conceptions of such a framework. Take, for the sake of argument and simplicity, Roger Griffin's concise fascist minimum: palingenetic ultranationalism.¹³³ This rebirth of the hyper-celebrated nation by fire is exactly what we can see here. While not directly or perfectly aligned with any particular fascism, which,

¹³¹ Susan Sontag, "Fascinating Fascism," in *Under the Sign of Saturn* (New York: Random House, 1980) 73-108.

¹³² Sontag, "Fascinating Fascism."

¹³³ Griffin, *Modernism and Fascism*.

as established above, is hardly possible nor a fair criterion, aesthetically, such is the project they work to advance.

Unamuno views Spain as culturally advantaged, so pure and so far above all other nations so as to advocate for their cultural isolation in order to protect its integrity. In order to kickstart the generation of this culture, while not the kind of militant violence generally associated with radical politics, Unamuno commits himself and calls for other creators to commit conceptual violence, tearing up and upending traditional conceptions of genre and writing itself, generating new forms of expression and rebuilding the nation by killing off the old. Machado and Dalí view the nation as in a state of decline. Dalí literally and directly supported and in some work celebrated violence and destruction as forms of creation, venerating tradition through his own aesthetic as well as through his work. Machado calls for a return to a better past and, while not as directly focused on the violent aspects, does present, through his veneration of the Spanish countryside and idealization of the nation, a clear nationalist bent.

With a consideration of the ideological characteristics of the work of Unamuno, Machado, and Dalí we can more directly rebuke Payne's complete and repeated dismissal of the *noventayochistas* as worthy of consideration in ideological projects. While it may be true that they can lend to the movement "aesthetic considerations," it is certainly not true that those considerations are not worthy of examination in themselves.¹³⁴ Aesthetics are not ideologically neutral and, when given proper consideration, can, in fact, be incredibly useful in developing a comprehensive picture of ideological development and can indeed show indications of the development of Spanish nationalism long before serious consideration is typically afforded to it. The very aesthetic considerations which Unamuno, Machado, and Dalí lend to Spain at the time

¹³⁴ Payne, *Falange*.

are the same considerations as more overtly political figures. It is precisely because of the aesthetic considerations developed by Unamuno, Machado, and Dalí that they warrant inclusion here.

Chapter 3- The Genesis of Palingenesis: The Transformative Potential and Morality of Violence

I. Introduction

In the United States, one of the most visible examples of the relationship between the contemporary radical right and violence comes in the form of Charlottesville. The death of Heather Heyer at a counter-protest to the Unite the Right rally occurring in protest of the removal of a statue of Robert E. Lee rocketed the Alt-Right to the attention of the nation. While the attack and protest itself is certainly worthy of further examination, so too is the subsequent analysis on the right of what occurred. While much of the rhetoric of the Alt-Right carefully skirts the edges of acceptability in terms of violence, both they and movements like the Identitarians tend to frame the use of violent action and resistance not as acts of aggression, but as necessary.¹³⁵ The threats of multi-culturalism, integration, political marginalization, socialism, etc. do more than simply justify their actions, but are centrally their core. As with the *Reconquista* and golden age, we see the roots of these ideas in the work of our fascist heralds.

It should be clear to this point that Ledesma, Giménez Caballero, Albiñana, and the *noventayochistas* in their way, are neither shy nor hesitant to call for a massive restructuring and revamping of Spain's self-conception and hegemonic status in a range of areas. Such a shift, paradigmatically, necessitates and commits them to a call for violent action. How can the empire be born again if it is not taken by force? How will the Second Republic fall if it is not toppled and overthrown? Indeed, Ledesma and Albiñana's views on dictatorship and governance include violence and repression as necessary functions of a successful state itself. As is common among

¹³⁵ Zúquete, *Identitarians*, 160, 304-06.

radical groups, however, much of the writing and advocacy of these figures centers not on a specific plan of action, but rather on revealing what they feel to be hidden truths of the world, calling for action to a defined end, but doing little by way of precisely defining what action is necessary along the way. This does not mean, however, that a conception of the nature of their views on violence is not discernible in their writings.

In order to understand how these heralds of fascism conceive of violence, it is first necessary to develop a general understanding of what constitutes violence and how violence can be understood. On a philosophical level, explicit and concentrated study of violence as a concept is relatively limited. As we are continually inundated with a barrage of violent imagery and rhetoric, both real and fictional, we have seen in the past several decades an explosion of talk and discussion on violence at its most basic level; at the same time, serious theorizing on the nature of violence remains relatively limited.¹³⁶ In part I of her analysis of violence in the latter half of the twentieth century, aptly named *On Violence*, renowned philosopher and political theorist Hannah Arendt observes, “No one concerned with history and politics can remain unaware of the enormous role violence has always played in human affairs; and it is at first glance rather surprising that violence has so seldom been singled out for special consideration.”¹³⁷ Those conceptualizations that do treat violence as its own distinct concept often fall into one of two categories: they consider either only very particular kinds of violent acts like terrorism, wars, or torture, or they take a normative ethical stance and seek to determine the permissibility of violence under particular frameworks or in particular circumstances, overwhelmingly taking a consequentialist approach.¹³⁸

¹³⁶ Richard J. Bernstein, *Violence: Thinking without Banisters* (Cambridge: Polity, 2013).

¹³⁷ Hannah Arendt, *On Violence* (New York: Harcourt Inc., 1970).

¹³⁸ Vittorio Bufacchi, “Introduction: Philosophy and Violence,” *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* 3, no. 265 (2013): 233-235.

Neither thinking of violence in terms of specific acts nor solely normatively offers us a ranging concept of violence that allows us to understand the nature of violence in itself nor to consider violence in contexts external to those highlighted in such works. Before proceeding it is important to clarify a key distinction regarding this particular study of violence. Violence in all forms, at its core, is fundamentally about the “violation of bodies and the destruction of human lives.”¹³⁹ For this reason, even if ethical theories of violence are subordinated, there are serious ethical concerns in attempting any kind of dispassionate study on the nature or objects of violence. This is not, nor is it intended to be, such a study. The examination of the nature of violence as conceived by these individuals and groups is not intended to be an endorsement on a pragmatic nor an ideological level. Indeed, the examination herein should not be taken as legitimizing the conceptualization of violence by these figures as a fully formed theory of violence, but as an examination of a topic important to these figures, considered in the form and to the degree it is presented in their major works.

Accepting either that violence can only be understood in particular instance or only within a framework that presupposes its immorality, we close ourselves off to serious consideration of theories which may fundamentally disagree. Such a framework causes us to treat what may, perhaps rightly should, be treated as full or fledgling serious theorizing on violence, not as dissenting theories, but as perversions of reality, wrong treatments of a settled issue. This precludes us from an honest consideration of such viewpoints, forcing us to treat them simply as wrong rather than constituting a more fundamental metaphysical or ethical disagreement. Insofar as such considerations on violence are often functions of achieving an ideological end, this lack of consideration leaves out half of a political project. Arendt continues,

¹³⁹ Brad Evans and Terrell Carver, “The Subject of Violence,” in *Histories of Violence: Post-War Critical Thought*, ed. Brad Evans and Terrell Carver (London: Zed Books, 2017), 5.

The very substance of violent action is ruled by the question of means and ends, whose chief characteristic, if applied to human affairs, has always been that the end is in danger of being overwhelmed by the means, which it both justifies and needs. Since the end of human action, in contrast with the products of fabrication, can never be reliably predicted, the means used to achieve political goals are more often than not of greater relevance to the future of the world than the intended goals.¹⁴⁰

In this way, examination of violence in itself, as theorized or as discrete acts, insofar as it constitutes the means by which to realize an ideological aim, provides us with a clearer picture of the particular political aims of a particular group or individual than an examination of their general conception of the order of the world. This is, of course, not to say we should advocate violence nor those theoretical frameworks that conceive of it as necessary. Failure to generate a theoretical understanding of those ideological frameworks who view violence as either necessary or even as virtuous prevents us from engaging in real discourse about the nature of violent action with such groups.

There is an importance and value to studying violence. Before moving on to discuss the particular views of Ledesma or Giménez Caballero, it is important to understand what violence is and, conversely, what it is not. Violence is a distinct kind of action or idea from power, force, and strength.¹⁴¹ As theorized by philosopher Friedrich Engels, while power, force, and strength can all be exercised on their own, violence necessitates implements; that is to say, power (ability), force (action), and strength (capacity) even when exercised do not constitute violence except when instrumental, that is, applied to the end to which they are enacted to accomplish.¹⁴² Engels explains, even were I to point a gun at someone, that use of force does not necessarily

¹⁴⁰ Arendt, *On Violence*.

¹⁴¹ Frederick Engels, *Anti-Dühring: Herr Eugen Dühring's Revolution in Science*, trans. Emile Burns (Progress Publishers, 1947).

¹⁴² Engels, *Anti-Dühring*.

constitute a violent action. It is when I have the instrument of my action, using my ability to enact force on another to, as in Engel's example, work for me so as to further my own economic situation (work, in this case, being the instrument of my action), that my act becomes violent.¹⁴³ Even insofar as an action may be vicious or even openly harmful, violence cannot be perpetuated in any real sense without an end, which is its instrument. In this way, violence is instrumental action.

Violence is in itself a destructive act. Per Arendt, "The distinction between violent and non-violent action is that the former is exclusively bent upon the destruction of the old and the latter is chiefly concerned with the establishment of something new."¹⁴⁴ Determining what particular systems or things are to be destroyed is one of the bases of political violence. While it is possible all forms of violence are at least somewhat political in character, how violence functions politically is a central consideration of most all examinations of the nature of violence.¹⁴⁵ Specifically and especially for our purposes, the ways in which ideology and theory relates to violence is of particular concern. After all, "Ideas give rise to violence just as it provides reasoning and explanations."¹⁴⁶

From all this, we can identify three major threads that need to be addressed if we are to truly undertake the project of articulating and drawing out what Ledesma, Giménez Caballero, Albiñana, and the *noventayochistas* think about the object and nature of violence. First, the nature of violence. Are they primarily concerned with what violence is or what violence does? Namely, is their work to understand violence concerned with what constitutes a violent act in itself or is it primarily focused on the ends of violence? Second, the politics of violence. In what

¹⁴³ Engels, *Anti-Dühring*.

¹⁴⁴ Arendt, *On Violence*.

¹⁴⁵ Evans and Carver, "Subject of Violence."

¹⁴⁶ Evans and Carver, "Subject of Violence."

ways do they conceive of violence as a political act? Is violence a means to a particular political end or is violence in and of itself a political action? Finally, the morality of violence. What is the value they assign to violence? Is violence immoral in itself?

As in all of the topics we have discussed thus far, Ledesma, Giménez Caballero, Albiñana, and the *noventayochistas* hardly present a united front on most issues. Violence is no exception. Not all of these four figures will be discussed in detail in each section, which is not necessarily a statement on their views regarding that topic, but simply a reflection of the fact there is simply not enough accessible material on their views regarding the topic.

II. Nature of Violence

As mentioned briefly at the start of the introduction, while there is a clear preoccupation with violence throughout the works of all the figures here, there is little to no discussion of explicit or specific plans to enact such violence. Ledesma begins to approach such a plan in an article published in *La conquista del estado* entitled “!Españoles Jóvenes!: !En pie de guerra!,” “Young Spaniards!: On the Warpath!”¹⁴⁷ The article, published initially as a bold front cover to the paper, calls on the young people of Spain to take up arms and form militias so as to fight off the pending scourge of communism and protect the integrity of Spain. Even accounting for Ledesma’s eventual role in the foundation of the JONS, the article, while constituting perhaps the beginning of a call for a particular kind of violence, is hardly a plan.

In this way, all of the thinkers here are generally more focused on the ends of violence than on the act itself. There appears in their work to collectively be no real or meaningful consideration about the nature of violence as an action, political or otherwise. Instead, likely

¹⁴⁷ Ramiro Ledesma Ramos, “!Españoles Jóvenes!: !En pie de guerra!” *La conquista del estado*, Proyecto Filosofía en español, online. <http://www.filosofia.org/hem/193/lce/lce051c.htm>.

much to the chagrin of these staunchly anti-communist figures, their conception of violence seems to align with Engels. It is the end of violence, the instrument, that constitutes violence itself. All advocating for the end of the Second Republic, most wanting the decline to be followed by the rise of dictatorship, violence against the state and against Republican forces is an important necessary step. Thus, while concerned neither with the particular nature of acts of violence, nor with the particular acts of violence they wanted their followers to perform, violence nonetheless remains a central feature of their respective ideologies.

III. Politics of Violence

In the tradition of Edwin Starr, what is all this violence good for? Ledesma, Giménez Caballero, and the *noventayochistas* (although in a slightly different manner that will be addressed below) all think of violence as a political necessity in order to achieve their respective goals. If violence is not perpetuated, the Republic will not fall, communism will overtake Spain, and the empire will be lost forever. The eruption of violence at such perceived injustices is all but inevitable. In another article in *La conquista*, Ledesma writes “There is no doubt that the world is going through a revolutionary age... A phase of violence is therefore inevitably approaching in the service of these convulsions.”¹⁴⁸ In another, “El grito de nuestra acción,” “The cry of our action,” he writes, “Very soon we will talk about these things because in Spain we are full of “conquerors;” we are of that lineage.”¹⁴⁹

These articles demonstrate two key features of the political nature of violence as Ledesma conceives it. First, violence is both necessary and inevitable. It is not so much that

¹⁴⁸ Ramiro Ledesma Ramos, “Plagio ineficaz: La violencia y la política actual,” *La conquista del estado*, Proyecto Filosofía en español, online. <http://www.filosofia.org/hem/193/lce/lce051c.htm>.

¹⁴⁹ Ramiro Ledesma Ramos, “El grito de nuestra acción,” *La conquista del estado*, Proyecto Filosofía en español, online. <http://www.filosofia.org/hem/193/lce/lce051c.htm>.

violence is a necessary step in the process toward a better system of governance as it is that the lack of this better governance will cause violence, a kind of collective protective instinct. This also reveals to us our second feature. For Ledesma, Spain is not defined by its current people or even by the circumstances of its past. As a nation, and as the nexus of all of this political violence, Spain is, at its core, an ideal, not a distant unachievable ideal but a very real and very extant, if suppressed perfect version of itself. It is that Spain and the people who see what Spain that should rise up against that which stands in the way of this nation from manifesting. Political violence, then, for Ledesma, is the necessary function of allowing for the nation to become its ideal self that he knows it can and should be.

Giménez Caballero presents a similar idea in *Genio de España*. The first time he returns to Madrid after the Civil War, with the nationalists having successfully wrested control from the Second Republic, he writes, “I feel the joy of triumph in my veins, the pride of reconquest in my viscera. And, the faith of Spanish destiny in my personal and intimate destiny.”¹⁵⁰ He, too, conceives of Spain as being held back by, now freed from, those who would prevent her flourishing. Written after the end of the Civil War, three long years of bloodshed and violence, Giménez Caballero does not feel the nation’s division or pain, but a “pride” in having saved his country from those who would keep it down, pride in, as we saw the import of previously, having “reconquered” Spain from occupiers.¹⁵¹

The *noventayochistas* seem to view themselves as working toward a similar goal, although on a slightly different front. Not all violence is purely physical. One of the central aims of the *noventayochistas*, and indeed of the larger project of modernism in general, is the challenging of conceptions and the regeneration and reinvention of genre, form, and content.

¹⁵⁰ Giménez Caballero, *Genio del Estado*.

¹⁵¹ Giménez Caballero, *Genio del Estado*.

This kind of reinvention and reconceptualization requires an unlearning, a process of consciously forgetting or ignoring traditional practices. This process creates a product that is at times shocking, jarring, or even unsettling for those to whom it is first presented.¹⁵² This kind of paradigmatic shift, I argue, constitutes a kind of conceptual and intellectual violence with a political end equal to that of the violence advocated by Ledesma and Giménez Caballero.

As discussed extensively in the previous chapter, much of the project of the *noventayochistas*, especially of Unamuno, was the recreation of the condition of Spanish cultural renaissance that seemed to occur during the era of the golden age. Since much of Spain's cultural power came in the rate and degree of innovation, from literature to painting to philosophy, Unamuno viewed it as his particular goal to create a new period and culture consisting of the generation of new ideas and new ways of expressing.

Unamuno's writing is singularly focused on innovation, on challenging the limits of genre and fiction. Unamuno aimed largely to emulate not just the content and style of Cervantes' writing, but its transformative and revolutionary potential. Cervantes' scathing satire and remarkable novel style and manner of writing made going back to that which was so common before nearly impossible. For Ledesma and Giménez Caballero, the end of violence is political transformation. As we have seen, literature and art are in themselves political and ideological mediums. In this way, Unamuno's focus on transformation, regeneration, and the end of a manner of expression constitutes an intellectual act of political violence, overthrowing one "regime" in favor of another.¹⁵³

¹⁵² Fredric Jameson, *Fables of Aggression: Wyndham Lewis, the Modernist as Fascist* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973).

¹⁵³ Giménez Caballero explicitly references the (degenerative) political potential of fiction in *Genio de España* in which he laments the fact that it was actually the publication of *Don Quijote* that precipitated the start of Spain's cultural decline. He writes, "Quijote is the spiritual correlation to the disaster that would be forged in Munster. The *Quijote* is the first "pure 98 mood." Alarm and

IV. Morality of Violence

Finally, we will look at the issue of the morality of violence. As discussed in the introduction, it is on this point where most theories and critical examinations of violence tend to land. Further still, these theories tend to take a consequentialist approach to understanding the rightness or wrongness of violence or of any particular violent act. For Ledesma and Giménez Caballero, and for the *noventayochistas* intellectually, there is an obvious good end to violence insofar as they view violence as necessary to achieve their ends and inevitable in the course of Spanish history.¹⁵⁴

It seems, however, that their views hold an even deeper conception of the goodness of violence. Ledesma, Albiñana, and Giménez Caballero seem to view violence as a good in itself and for its own sake. As discussed in Chapter 1, Albiñana and Giménez Caballero hold rather Cortésian views on the nature of government and of repression. Per Cortés, the end of government is near absolute repression whether religiously or politically. While the end of such oppression which, by its nature necessitates violence, is an ideal form of government, yes, it is further a good in itself; it is the rule and act of the divine. The nature of this particular kind of governance endorsed by Albiñana and Giménez Caballero is not just that repressive government is a good actor but that violent repression in itself is good action regardless of its instrument.

Ledesma presents a similar view regarding the nature of warfare in *La conquista*. In “Young Spaniards!: On the Warpath!” he laments not just the loss of Spanish empire and the

irony. The first farewell to all Spanish greatness and adventure;” Giménez Caballero, *Genio de España*, 35.

¹⁵⁴ It bears repeating at this juncture that this is not to be read as an endorsement of nor in agreement with the views of these authors and figures.

threat of non-Spanish rule, but Spain's non-involvement in World War I.¹⁵⁵ In the course of the first world war, Spain remained officially neutral, largely thanks to their own domestic political and economic difficulties. The Prime Minister at the time, Eduardo Dato, declared neutrality as the official policy of the government and of its people, writing in 1914 that "the Government of His Majesty believes in the duty to order the strictest neutrality to all Spanish subjects."¹⁵⁶ Likely in response to this decree and the position in general, Ledesma writes "We are going against the primal desertions of the old and expired generation, which during the European War made Spain deal with the great shame of not seriously considering the problem of intervention, alongside the great peoples of the world. War on the decrepit old men for not going to war!"¹⁵⁷

Here, he argues not just that the old order should be overthrown in favor of a new one, a violent act justified in its ends, but also that there is a shame in Spain's lack of involvement in World War I. Not participating in the war, officially entertaining a policy of neutrality, affords Spain a kind of shame in their non-participation in violence. The violent act, which would have indubitably harmed Spain physically, economically, and developmentally at the time, is good in itself. Violence for the sake of violence when necessary is both good and right; conversely, inaction, not using violence where violence should happen, is a shameful and immoral act.

Ledesma furthers the idea of the necessary goodness of violence in his talk about the responsibilities of contemporary Spanish citizens. The threat of the Second Republic, of communism and liberal ideologies, of the permanent loss of empire, all amount to a war on traditional and righteous Spain. He writes in another article in *La conquista*, "Our Battle: The Front of Communism," "In front of the communist company fits the national company...Feeling

¹⁵⁵ Carr, *Spain*.

¹⁵⁶ Quoted in Carr, *Spain*.

¹⁵⁷ Ledesma, "¡Españoles Jóvenes!: ¡En pie de guerra!"

called to the great elaboration of crafting a full humanity.”¹⁵⁸ It is here we see another departure from traditional conceptions of violence. Not only is violence morally good, but, exactly contrary to Arendt’s conceptualization and the end of violence as destruction and non-violence as creation, for Ledesma, violence has a generative power. It is in violent action and outright warfare that the new, better nation is born and in the fight itself that people are able to become better versions of themselves, in which they achieve a “full humanity.”¹⁵⁹ This conception is not uncommon among proto-fascist ideologues. The Futurists perhaps most famously espouse a similar view, considering “War – the only hygiene of the world” and lauding the ability of violent action to cleanse the world of the undeserving and shape the valiant character of the chosen few.¹⁶⁰

V. The Comparative Case

No discussion of the nature of violence, especially of the nature of violence in radical movements, could be complete without some discussion of the ideas of anti-colonial theorist Frantz Fanon. In the iconic first chapter of his book *The Wretched of the Earth*, “On Violence,” Fanon talks about the nature, necessity, and inevitability of political violence by the colonized people of Algeria against their colonial occupation by France.¹⁶¹ Fanon’s unique and revolutionary (both literally and intellectually) conceptualization of violence and his subsequent

¹⁵⁸ Ramiro Ledesma Ramos, “Nuestra batalla: Frente al comunismo,” *La conquista del estado*, Proyecto Filosofía en español, online. <http://www.filosofia.org/hem/193/lce/lce051c.htm>.

¹⁵⁹ Ramos, “Nuestra batalla.”

¹⁶⁰ F.T. Marinetti, “Founding and Manifesto of Futurism,” in *Futurism: An Anthology*, ed. Lawrence Rainey, Christine Poggi, and Laura Wittman (United States: Sheridan Books, 2009) 51.

¹⁶¹ Frantz Fanon, “On Violence,” in *The Wretched of the Earth* (New York: Grove Press, 1963), 1-52.

impact on all the theorists who succeed him make his inclusion in any study of the idea a necessity.¹⁶²

Trained as a psychologist and a native of Martinique, over the course of his life, Fanon became intimately involved in the anti-colonial struggle of the Algerian people in their revolt against French control.¹⁶³ While the even more extreme views and interpretation of Fanon present in Jean Paul Sartre's Preface to *The Wretched of the Earth* and subsequent criticisms of Fanon's views have somewhat distorted popular conception of his actual ideas, in essence Fanon was working to create a theory of violence born of violence.¹⁶⁴ While Fanon does not seem, necessarily, to espouse a particularly moralizing view on the nature of violence, he does, however, regard it as necessary. In the wake of the generations of colonial violence inflicted on the people of Algeria on the part of the French government, such violence is to be returned to the occupying force if and when the Algerian people are to regenerate a sense of identity and national consciousness.¹⁶⁵ The totalitarian nature of colonial occupation requires violence as the means of liberation. It is only in violence and with violence, returning that which they were given, that the colonized can begin to reconceive of themselves as fully human once again, as full citizens of a nation they conceive of collectively and separately from their colonial past.¹⁶⁶ Also in contrast with Arendt, Fanon seems to conceive of violence as productive, as capable of creating something, even as the only way of creating something necessary, even in its destructive force.

¹⁶² Evans and Carver, "Subject of Violence."

¹⁶³ David Macey, *Frantz Fanon: A Biography* (London: Verso, 2012).

¹⁶⁴ Jean-Paul Sartre, "Preface" in *The Wretched of the Earth* (New York: Grove Press, 1963), xliii-lxii; Macey, *Frantz Fanon*.

¹⁶⁵ Fanon, "On Violence."

¹⁶⁶ Fanon, "On Violence."

Other than the colonized, there is none so familiar with the colonial narrative than the colonizer, so it should perhaps come as no surprise that a similar conception, if wrongly appropriated, appears for our fascist heralds. After all, the loss of empire, of held colonies, serves as one of the most central motivating “traumas” for the radicalization of Ledesma, Giménez Caballero, and Albiñana, and for the artistic works of the *noventayochistas* (and as the event from which they choose to name themselves no less.) Obviously, the situation of Spain post-Spanish American War, even as they continued to struggle economically and politically, is nowhere near the level or nature of the desperation of a colonial occupation. Equally clear, however, and a narrative we see time and time again, is the co-opting of the rhetoric of oppression by nominally non-repressed groups. Specifically, although writing decades before Fanon in *Wretched of the Earth*, these fascist heralds seem to be generating an almost identical thesis: the only way to liberate the Spanish people from their oppressors is violence, even if the end of their violent action is further, albeit different, repression, rather than Fanon’s aim of liberation.

This kind of false colonial narrative can be seen in the way in which all figures talk about and conceive of non-nationalist Spanish government. In many ways, the very conceptualization of their own cause as nationalistic, beyond the traditional conception as pride or patriotism in nation, seems to function as much to mean *of* Spain as acting in it.¹⁶⁷ Those standing in opposition to their project, then, are not so much lacking in pride in what it is to be Spanish as they lack a Spanish character all together. Ledesma touches on this theme repeatedly throughout articles in *La conquista*, framing the fledgling Second Republic as communist, which he in turn views as an “eastern,” non-Spanish and more broadly non-European ideology.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁷ Giménez Caballero, *Genio de España*; Ledesma, “Plagio ineficaz.”

¹⁶⁸ Ledesma, *La conquista del estado*.

The theme and celebration of the *Reconquista*, of conceiving of themselves as conquerors and soldiers in a hold resistance to an occupying other, helps to solidify this idea. The *Reconquista* was a resistance against, an effort to expel a non-Castilian occupying force. Then as now, viewed in this manner, Spain is not just being held back by a liberal Spanish government, but is being occupied by a foreign power, by something completely lacking in Spanish character. This both heightens the perceived legitimacy of their own cause as well as solidifies their conceptualization of the revolt against non-nationalist government and ideology as a more completely war-like action and cause.

Conclusion: The Post-Fascist Question

I. Spain Today

After the fall of the Franco regime following Franco's death by congenital heart failure, the nation's decision for reckoning with the destruction of the civil war and nearly 40 years of dictatorship was simply to collectively agree to not talk about it. The *Pacto de Olvido*, or Pact of Forgetting, was passed with near universal support in 1977 and concretized for 30 years a willful ignorance of the over 300,000 dead and 440,000 exiled in the civil war alone, made the provision of public funds for the identification of victims of the war or Francoism impossible, and forbade teaching about the civil war or Falange.¹⁶⁹

It was only in 2007 with the passage of the *Ley de Memoria Histórica*, or Law of Historical Memory, that real work began to take place to exhume and identify the bodies from the nearly 2,500 mass graves around Spain from nearly a century before and to begin to reckon with the impacts of Francoism. This included the ongoing work to combat the effects of his expansive and enduring censorship. All works published in Spain and all non-Spanish-language works coming into and being translated in Spain were thoroughly vetted by a national board of censors. Rather than simply denying publication, censors would, instead, simply edit out, change, or redub parts of movies, books, or television shows considered offensive or not in keeping with Francoist standards. Even today, these censored versions of texts are sometimes the only available Spanish language versions, most often unbeknownst to those reading them.¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁹ Madeleine Davis, "Is Spain Recovering Its Memory? Breaking the "Pacto del Olvido," *Human Rights Quarterly* 27, no. 3 (2005): 858-880.

¹⁷⁰ In the case of James Baldwin's *Go Tell it on the Mountain*, for example, the only version available in Spanish even today has been edited so as to eliminate all references to birth control and sex. While it has been translated in whole since, it is still not uncommon to find copies of *Rosemary's Baby* that have large sections missing deemed to have "glorified Satan." These problems do not just effect Spain, but all Spanish speaking countries, many of whom unwittingly use censored

It should perhaps come as no surprise, then, that until October of 2019, and moved only after a particularly fierce Supreme Court battle, Franco's body lay interred with honors in an incredibly grand monument to fallen nationalist soldiers still formally recognized by the Vatican as a basilica.¹⁷¹ Spain's history with nationalism is far from over, nor have they still fully reckoned with the nationalism of their history. Radical right part Vox, gaining support and rising to power today is still working to repeal the Law of Historical Memory and at times openly venerates Franco himself.¹⁷² Not simply isolated to Spain, such efforts, as well as the party itself, have been praised by the head of France's own radical right party, the National Rally, Marine Le Pen. The effects of nationalism and Spanish nationalism, pre- and post-Franco are still indelibly a part of the European continent today and it is in no small part because of the endurance and peculiarity of the Spanish case that it perhaps makes for an ideal source for modern radical right figures.

Clearly, however, the exact nature, or, often, the existence of the Franco regime was simply not available to Ledesma, Giménez Caballero, Albiñana, and the Generation of 98, nor was it their goals. Certainly, they could not have foreseen Vox or the National Rally. And, at the risk of committing the dual sins of anachronism and prolepsis Skinner so opposed, the examination of these ideas for their own sake is a worthy endeavor in itself.¹⁷³

versions of major works; Jordi Cornelià-Detrell, "Franco's Invisible Legacy: Books Across the Hispanic World Are Still Scarred by His Censorship," *The Conversation*, April 15, 2019.

¹⁷¹ Stephanie Taladrid, "Franco's Body is Exhumed, as Spain Struggles to Confront the Past," *The New Yorker*, October 26, 2019. <https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/francos-body-is-exhumed-as-spain-still-struggles-to-confront-the-past>.

¹⁷² J.J. Gálvez, "Vox: The Far-Right Party That Made Shock Gains in the Regional Polls," *El País*, December 3, 2018. https://english.elpais.com/elpais/2018/12/03/inenglish/1543831474_046256.html

¹⁷³ Skinner, "Meaning and Understanding."

Skinner's method is often lauded as an intermediary between method and politics, taking the theoretically dense and academically rigorous process of intellectual history into practice with real implications for reconciliation of ideas or to generate a better understanding of modern politics.¹⁷⁴ To this end, our analysis of these figures, while valuable in itself, holds further importance in our understanding and conceptualizing more modern radical movements, as well as an imperative to view them for their own sake. This kind of work is especially relevant to this project because much of the languages generated and formulated by these figures here is echoed explicitly through to today.

Reconquista, the *siglo de oro*, and the nature of violence are hardly an exhaustive list of potential avenues for examination on the points uniting our fascist heralds. There are undoubtedly other areas of overlap between two, three, or even all figures, but for the sake of concision, these three general trends most obviously predominate. Unsurprisingly, these same topics appear clearly and repeatedly in the texts, propaganda, and broader documentary corpus of the Francoist state that followed them. The Franco crest emblazoned on the center of the Spanish flag under his rule featured the crest of the Catholic kings and queens that led Spain during the *Reconquista*. The Falangist symbol and flag featured the arrows and yoke also from the crest, folding Franco and the nationalists explicitly and consciously into that history.¹⁷⁵

Celebration of empire was also a central feature, a function we can see made obvious in the information presented to children in the party-controlled school system. In one second grade textbook from the 1950s, the information presented about the nature of the Spanish Empire and the exploration reads more like a propaganda reel than a history textbook. For example:

The most glorious destiny of all was reserved for our fatherland: to discover the New World, to add them to our Empire and to make them a part of our

¹⁷⁴ Whatmore, "Quentin Skinner."

¹⁷⁵ Payne, *Falange*.

Christian civilization...More glory than for the discovery of the Americas goes to Spain for the way they carried out the civilization of these countries, to that end with a touching wakefulness, not equaled by any other civilized nation, made heirs to their religion, their language, and all their cultural heritage.¹⁷⁶

Ledesma's role in the formation of the JONS, Unamuno and Machado's prominence, and all figures' general prolificacy undoubtedly had influence over the final products of the Falangist state.

While not all of our fascist heralds were directly involved in the organizing of the nationalist movement or in the civil war itself, their ideas, and the direct tracking of many of the same ideas into the rise and ideology of the Francoist regime demonstrates a fairly clear and robust organizing potential. The concepts of Reconquista, cultural generation, and even violence, a central, if implicit, concept, are clearly central to the motivating moves of more modern radical right movements. While this understanding does not necessarily, certainly not by itself, provide us with any particular clarity into the future of the Identitarian movement, it does, perhaps, provide us with another way to look at them, another way to understand their particular language and the history into which they have chosen to fold themselves. Without an individual and separate examination of pre- and proto-fascist ideologies and thinkers, such connections among post-fascists would be otherwise impossible.

II. Making Sense of Connections to the Contemporary Radical Right

In what follows, we will be departing somewhat from Skinner's methodology. While it in no way should be read as the idea that Ledesma and the like in any way anticipated the contemporary radical right, as those who live in contemporary societies, the motivating impetus for the use of insights gained here to look at such groups is clear. Establishing a connection

¹⁷⁶ Edelvives, *Historia de España: Segundo grado* (Huesca, Spain: Diocese of Huesca, 1950).

between the fascist heralds that have been the focus of this study and the modern radical right serves a dually important purpose: first, it provides us with a more internally consistent logic by which to regard the views of the modern radical right, and second, it allows us to consider the contemporary radical right as less anomalous.

First, in any in-depth examination of the politics, writings, and advocacy of groups it becomes almost immediately evident that in many ways, such movements seem to speak with a language all their own. In many ways, this kind of layering of terminology, messaging, and methods of dissemination are born out of their status as radical groups. This kind of secrecy and communication is shaped at least in part because of the fundamental nature of groups on the radical right. Inherent in any racist or radical group is some level of fear.¹⁷⁷ Not only do these groups fear-monger and work to intimidate racial, ethnic, or cultural minorities, but they also live with a great deal of fear: fear of being found out, fear of discovery, or fear of reprisal.¹⁷⁸ In the case of Europe, which lacks the kind of radical free speech protections present in the United States, obtuse methods of communication allow for more substantive conversations while not skirting the line of acceptability or legality. In this way, we can find further value in a more in depth understanding of figures like Ledesma or Giménez Caballero not just in themselves, but also, albeit separately, in their impact and our understanding of their modern counterparts. Working to uncover, concretely understand, and more completely identify the history of the radical right, we can better understand the modern radical right in a very literal way. This kind of analysis can allow us to become privy to an otherwise private and exclusive conversation they work to create and through which they often attempt to shield and protect themselves.

¹⁷⁷ Blee, “White-Knuckle Research.”

¹⁷⁸ Blee, “White-Knuckle Research.”

Second, even as far- and radical right parties continue to gain support and even electoral victory around the world, from Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil to Narendra Modi in India to Viktor Orbán in Hungary there seems to be a pervasive and continuing belief that, perhaps if we put in enough effort to combat these groups, or when they eventually and inevitably run their course, we will return to a state of business as normal. The vitriol and, for many, odiousness of these movements and leaders seems anomalous, in part because “there has been some reluctance to probe the emotional landscapes of social movements. At least in part this is due to efforts to understand social movements as products of rational social action rather than as outcomes of irrational collective behavior.”¹⁷⁹ Thinking in this way, it may be less that the modern radical right is a series of unlikely or unexplainable disturbances across the world, but instead that their pervasive success is a greater indicator that the logic, systems, and practices we have for understanding social movements, even radical social movements, is simply insufficient or faulty for explaining these kinds of events.

If we can see clearly and repeatedly that precursors to fascist governance on a large or national scale include movements like our Spanish fascist heralds, like the Futurists in Italy, and continuously and repeatedly treat them as the logical introduction to studies of their respective fascisms, and simultaneously can track and chart the rallying cries and organizing impetuses for such movements directly onto the modern radical right, it feels remiss to not consider such connections more holistically. This is not to say that it need necessarily be true that groups like the Identitarians or CasaPound, or even the election of radical right figures or parties necessarily indicates immediate threat of fascism. It is necessarily true, however, and as we have seen,

¹⁷⁹ Blee, “White-Knuckle Research,” 382.

simply trying to ignore or treating as ineffable such groups can have truly disastrous consequences.

There seems to be a tendency in academic circles to write off much of the radical right as not worthy of critical examination. The problems with writing off such groups has already been elaborated, but, moreso here, the justification for such a move is somewhat different than in the case of Ledesma, Giménez Caballero, and Albiñana. When studying the radical right, especially youth-based movements like the Alt-Right or the Identitarians, their particular methods of communication can be off-putting and puzzling. Using memes, drenching real political claims in irony and sarcasm, or using otherwise oblique references to obscure parts of political theory can make it seem, collectively, that much of their advocacy and work amounts to nothing but a bunch of nonsense even to an informed observer. We should caution ourselves, however, that these political movements are just that – both political and very real movements.

The works of radical right political theorists, both the classical and more contemporary are woefully understudied and examined, in no small part because they at times seem contradictory and to many actively distasteful. It is precisely in these unexamined corners where the political languages that otherwise seem nonsensical reside. It is in the works of Julius Evola, Carl Schmitt, Donoso Cortés, and Ledesma, Giménez Caballero, and Albiñana where a clearer understanding of these dialogues can be discovered, where sense can be made of nonsense, even if we might not like what it says. If we do not understand what it is we oppose, we run the very real risk of underestimating, misunderstanding, or ignoring a politics that seems new but in fact has a very long history and tradition. The intellectual history of the radical right is one that for a long time has lived in relative obscurity, perhaps rightfully so. The parties, organizations, and political groups in the contemporary radical right, however, are now firmly out of that shadow

and, perhaps more than ever, have risen to international attention. It is incumbent upon us to generate a true understanding of the figures we have so long ignored, and it is only with this understanding that we can begin to truly understand the rising tide of the contemporary radical right. Understanding is the first step toward any further action. To continue to relegate the study of pre- and proto-fascist presses, groups, and individuals to the status of introductory devices on the way to our actual projects or simply ignoring them altogether risks turning our current parallels into just that: a first step on the way to something much worse, the future introduction to a potentially dangerous history we may have to live.

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